that it is derived from the verse: ''All that the Lord has commanded you by the hand of Moses, from the day that the Lord commanded and onward throughout your generations'' (Numbers 15:23). Which is the mitzva that was stated at the beginning of all the mitzvot? You must say: This is idol worship, as it is the first mitzva in the Ten Commandments. The Gemara asks: But didn’t the Master say: The Jewish people were commanded ten mitzvot in Marah soon after leaving Egypt, prior to the revelation at Sinai, as it is written: ''If you shall hearken to the voice of the Lord your God…and listen to His mitzvot'' (Exodus 15:26)? Evidently, there were mitzvot that preceded the prohibition against idol worship. Rather, it is clear as we initially answered.

MISHNA: The court is not liable to bring a bull as an unwitting communal sin-offering for issuing a ruling with regard to a positive mitzva or a prohibition related to the defiling of the Temple by one being there while ritually impure, or the defiling of its sacrificial foods by one partaking of them while ritually impure. There is a positive mitzva to remove impure people from the Temple, and there is a prohibition against entering the Temple while in a state of ritual impurity. And one does not bring a provisional guilt-offering for a positive mitzva or a prohibition related to the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods.

But the court is liable to bring a bull for a positive mitzva or for a prohibition that is related to a menstruating woman, and one brings a provisional guilt-offering for a positive mitzva or for a prohibition that is related to a menstruating woman. What is the positive mitzva that is related to a menstruating woman? Distance yourself from the menstruating woman. If a man engages in intercourse with a woman and she begins menstruating, he is required to separate from her. And what is the prohibition? Do not engage in intercourse with a woman whom you know is a menstruating woman.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? That is, from where is it derived that the general public is not liable to bring any offering at all for a sin like the defiling of the Temple, which carries no liability for an individual to bring a fixed sin-offering for violating it unwittingly, and from where is it derived that an individual too is not liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering for the defiling of the Temple?

Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi says: The term ''and he is guilty'' is stated with regard to a sin-offering (Leviticus 4:27) and with regard to a provisional guilt-offering (Leviticus 5:17), and the similar term: ''And they are guilty'' (Leviticus 4:13), is stated with regard to the general public. Just as the term ''and he is guilty'' that is stated with regard to an individual is concerning a transgression for which one is liable to bring a fixed sin-offering, as it is written there, so too, the term ''and they are guilty'' that is stated with regard to the general public is concerning a transgression for which one is liable to bring a fixed sin-offering. For the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, not a fixed offering.

And just as with regard to a transgression performed by the general public the liability is to bring a fixed sin-offering, so too, a provisional guilt-offering comes only for uncertainty with regard to a transgression that renders one obligated to bring a fixed sin-offering. This is the source for the fact that there is no liability to bring a sin-offering if the general public defiles the Temple or its sacrificial foods, and individuals are not liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering for those transgressions. The Sages say: If so, and the derivation is based on that term, this is difficult, as isn’t it also written with regard to a sliding-scale offering: ''And it shall be when he shall be guilty of one of these matters'' (Leviticus 5:5)? The Gemara responds: One derives the meaning of ''they are guilty'' from the meaning of ''he is guilty,'' but one does not derive the meaning of ''he is guilty'' from the meaning of ''he shall be guilty,'' even though both are stated in the singular.

The Gemara asks: And what difference is there between the different verb conjugations? But didn’t the school of Rabbi Yishmael teach a verbal analogy with regard to leprosy of houses? The verse states: ''And the priest shall return [veshav]'' (Leviticus 14:39), and another verse with regard to the priest’s visit seven days later states: ''And the priest shall come [uva] and look'' (Leviticus 14:44). This returning and this coming have the same meaning and one can therefore derive by verbal analogy that the halakha that applies if the leprosy had spread at the conclusion of the first week applies if it had spread again by the end of the following week. If a verbal analogy can be derived between two different terms, it can certainly be derived from two conjugations of the same term. And furthermore, let us derive the halakha from the term ''and he is guilty,'' written with regard to the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, as it is written: ''And he is ritually impure and he is guilty'' (Leviticus 5:2), which is a verbal analogy between identical terms.

Rav Pappa says: One derives the meaning of: ''And he is guilty,'' and: ''The commandments of the Lord'' (Leviticus 5:17), which are written with regard to a provisional guilt-offering, from the meaning of: ''And they are guilty,'' and: ''The commandments of the Lord'' (Leviticus 4:13), which are written with regard to the unwitting communal sin-offering. The phrase: The commandments of the Lord, is not written with regard to the sliding-scale offering. Rav Shimi bar Ashi said to Rav Pappa: Let us derive the meaning of: ''And he is guilty and bearing of iniquity'' (see Leviticus 5:1, 4), from the meaning of: ''And he is guilty and bearing of iniquity'' (Leviticus 5:17).

Rather, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: One derives the meaning of ''and he is guilty'' and ''the commandments of the Lord that shall not be done'' written with regard to a provisional guilt-offering, from the meaning of: ''And he is guilty,'' and: ''The commandments of the Lord that shall not be done'' (Leviticus 4:27), written with regard to a fixed sin-offering. And the cases of hear-ing of a voice, i.e., an oath of testimony, and a statement of the lips, i.e., an oath on an utterance, and the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, for which one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, shall not prove otherwise, as it is not stated concerning them: And he is guilty, and: The commandments of the Lord that shall not be done.

MISHNA: The court is not liable for issuing a ruling with regard to hearing of a voice, i.e., a false oath of testimony taken by a witness who refuses to testify on behalf of a litigant who demands that he testify, or for an utterance of the lips, i.e., a false oath stated about some matter, or for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods. And the status of the king is like that of the court, and he is exempt from bringing an offering in those cases; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Rabbi Akiva says: The king is liable in all of those cases except for the case of hearing of a voice, and even in that case, his exemption is not intrinsic to the mitzva. Rather, it is for technical reasons, as the king neither judges others nor do others judge him; he does not testify nor do others testify against him. Therefore, a demand that he testify is not applicable.

GEMARA: Ulla said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili? It is as the verse states with regard to a sliding-scale offering: ''And it shall be when he shall be guilty of one of these matters'' (Leviticus 5:5), indicating that anyone who becomes liable in every one of the instances for which one brings a sliding-scale offering becomes liable in all of those instances; and anyone who does not become liable in every one of the instances to bring a sliding-scale offering does not become liable in any of those instances. Since the king is exempt from taking an oath of testimony, he is exempt in the other cases as well.

The Gemara asks: Why say this? And say an alternative interpretation of the verse: Anyone who becomes liable in any one of these instances brings a sliding-scale offering, and this is the halakha even though he does not become liable in all of them.

Rather, the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili is from here, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yirmeya would say: It is stated: