And the defining characteristic [re’i] of the category of Eating, where it is not the objective of the animal to cause damage, is not similar to the defining characteristic of the category of Goring, where the objective of the animal is to cause damage.

The Gemara asks: But isn’t it possible to derive Goring from Eating by means of an a fortiori inference: If in a case of Eating, where it is not the objective of the animal to cause damage, its owner is liable, with regard to Goring, where the objective of the animal is to cause damage, should the owner not all the more so be liable? The Gemara answers: Nevertheless, it was necessary for the Torah to state the case of Goring, as it might enter your mind to say that the owner is exempt, just as he is exempt in the case where his slave or maidservant causes damage. When a slave or maidservant causes damage, is it not so that although their objective is to cause damage, even so their owners are exempt from liability; and so too, when one’s animal causes damage, it is no different. To dispel this notion, the Torah explicitly states that one is liable for damage caused by the primary category of Goring.

Rav Ashi said: Is that to say that in a case where one’s slave or maidservant causes damage there is not a substantial reason to exempt the master? In that case there is concern that perhaps his master will provoke him and in retribution he will go and set fire to another’s stack of grain, and it is found that this slave renders his master liable to pay one hundred maneh, ten thousand dinars, each day. Therefore, there is no basis for the notion that an ox that gores would be exempt just as a slave is exempt, as perhaps, fundamentally, one is liable to pay for damage caused by his slave. A master is exempt from payment to prevent a situation where a slave would exploit that situation to take revenge against his master.

Rather, the mishna refutes any possibility to derive the halakhot of Ox from Maveh or Maveh from Ox in this manner: The characteristic of the category of Goring, where the objective of the animal is to cause damage, is not similar to the characteristic of the category of Eating, where it is not the objective of the animal to cause damage, and the characteristic of the category of Eating, where there is pleasure for the animal in the course of its causing damage, is not similar to the characteristic of the category of Goring, where there is no pleasure for the animal in the course of its causing damage.

According to Rav Yehuda’s explanation of Shmuel’s opinion, among the primary categories of damage caused by an ox, the mishna mentions only Goring and Eating. The Gemara asks: But what of the category of Trampling; did the tanna omit it from the mishna? The Gemara answers: The principle stated in general terms at the end of the mishna: And when a component of any of these categories causes damage, the owner or generator of the component that caused damage is obligated to remit payments of restitution for damage with best-quality land, serves to include the primary category of Trampling.

The Gemara asks: But if the intent of the tanna is to teach the primary category of Trampling as well, let him teach it explicitly. Accordingly, Rav Yehuda’s explanation of how Shmuel interprets the mishna is rejected.

Rather, Rava said that according to Shmuel, the tanna teaches Ox specifically with regard to actions that cause damage with its foot and it teaches Maveh with regard to actions that cause damage with its tooth. And when the mishna contrasts Ox with Maveh this is what the tanna is saying: The defining characteristic of the primary category of Trampling, where its damage is commonplace, is not similar to the defining characteristic of the primary category of Eating, where its damage is not commonplace, and the defining characteristic of the primary category of Eating, where there is pleasure for the animal in the course of its causing damage, is not similar to the characteristic of the primary category of Trampling, where there is no pleasure for the animal in the course of its causing damage.

According to Rav Yehuda’s explanation of Shmuel’s opinion, among the primary categories of damage with regard to an ox, the mishna mentions only Goring and Trampling. The Gemara asks: But what of the primary category of Goring; did the tanna omit it from the mishna? The Gemara answers: The principle stated in general terms at the end of the mishna: And when a component of any of these categories causes damage, the owner or generator of the component that caused damage is obligated to remit payments of restitution for damage with best-quality land, serves to include the primary category of Goring.

The Gemara asks: But if the intent of the tanna is to teach the primary category of Goring as well, let him teach it explicitly. The Gemara explains: It is with regard to those categories of damage where the animal is forewarned from the outset and the owner is liable to pay for the entire damage the first time his animal causes damage that the tanna of the mishna speaks; but with regard to those categories of damage where the animal is initially innocuous and the owner is liable to pay only half the cost of the damage caused by his animal, and the animal is ultimately forewarned, the tanna of the mishna does not speak of them. With regard to Goring, the first three times an ox gores a person or an animal the owner of the ox pays only half of the damages. This is because an ox is considered forewarned with regard to damage categorized as Goring only after it attacks three times.

After addressing the reason that Rav did not say that Maveh refers to Eating in accordance with the explanation of Shmuel, the Gemara asks: And as for Shmuel, what is the reason that he did not say that Maveh refers to Man, as does Rav? Shmuel could have said to you, if it enters your mind to say that Maveh is Man, isn’t it taught in the latter clause of the mishna (15b): Both a forewarned ox, and an ox that causes damage in the domain of the injured party, and any damage caused by man? Apparently, Man was mentioned in the latter clause of the mishna because it was not mentioned in the first clause.

The Gemara asks: But let the tanna teach Man among the primary categories of damage in the first clause. The Gemara explains: It is with regard to those categories of damage caused by one’s property that the tanna of the mishna speaks; but with regard to the category of damage caused by one’s body, the category of Man, the tanna of the mishna does not speak.

The Gemara asks: And according to Rav, too, the same difficulty arises: Isn’t damage caused by a man taught in the latter clause of the mishna? The Gemara answers: Rav could have said to you: That mention of damage caused by a man in the latter clause comes to enumerate that damage together with the other forms of damage in a case where the owner of the cause of damage or the generator of that damage is forewarned.

The Gemara asks: And according to Rav, what is the meaning of the statement in the mishna: The defining characteristic of the primary category of Ox is not similar to the defining characteristic of the primary category of Maveh?

The Gemara explains: This is what the mishna is saying: The defining characteristic of the primary category of Ox, where if the ox kills a person the owner pays the ransom to the heirs of the injured party, is not similar to the defining characteristic of the primary category of Man, where one who kills another does not pay the ransom for killing him; rather, if he killed him unwittingly he is exiled and if he did so intentionally he is executed. And the defining characteristic of the primary category of Man, where if one injures another he is liable to pay four types of indemnity, i.e., pain, humiliation, medical costs, and the loss of livelihood, in addition to payment for the damage, is not similar to the defining characteristic of the primary category of Ox, where the owner of the ox is not liable to pay four types of indemnity and is liable to pay only the cost of the damage.

The Gemara questions Rav’s understanding that Ox, as mentioned in the mishna, includes all actions an ox performs that cause damage, including goring, based on the continuation of the mishna: The common denominator of the components in all these primary categories of damage is that it is their typical manner to cause damage. The Gemara asks: But is it the typical manner of an ox to cause damage by goring? The Gemara answers: The statement in the mishna is with regard to a forewarned ox. The Gemara asks: But is it the typical manner of a forewarned ox to cause damage by goring? The Gemara answers: Yes, once it was forewarned after goring repeatedly, its typical manner is to cause damage by goring.

The Gemara questions Rav’s understanding that Maveh is the primary category of Man: Is it man’s typical manner to cause damage? The Gemara answers: The statement in the mishna is referring to the damage one causes while sleeping. The Gemara asks: Is it the typical manner of a person to cause damage while sleeping? The Gemara answers: Since one contracts and extends his limbs while sleeping, it is his typical manner to damage objects placed next to him.

If Maveh is referring to Man, is it correct to state, as the mishna does in its enumeration of common denominators of the primary categories: And responsibility for their safeguarding is incumbent upon you? That formulation is appropriate in cases where one is safeguarding another person, animal, or item. When applied to the primary category of Man, it would indicate that responsibility to safeguard one person is incumbent upon another person. With regard to man, responsibility for safeguarding his body is incumbent upon him alone, not upon anyone else.

The Gemara responds: And according to your reasoning, that the formulation: And their safeguarding is incumbent upon you, indicates that Maveh is not Man, there is a difficulty with that which the Sage Karna taught in a baraita: There are four primary categories of damage, and Man is one of them. That baraita continues and states that one common denominator is: Their safeguarding is incumbent upon you. With regard to that baraita, the same question arises: With regard to Man, responsibility for safeguarding his body is incumbent upon him, not upon anyone else, and the wording of Karna is imprecise. Rather, just as Rabbi Abbahu said to the tanna, who was reciting the baraita in the study hall: Teach the baraita: And with regard to Man, responsibility for safeguarding his body is incumbent upon him;