The Gemara asks: But let Rabbi Akiva say to himself the same objection that he raised against Rabbi Eliezer’s interpretation of the verse, that the owner of an innocuous ox is exempt from paying half a ransom (see 41b): Why is it necessary for the verse to teach this? But isn’t compensation for damage caused by an innocuous ox itself paid only from the value of its body? Therefore, its owner can say to the slave’s owner: Bring it to court and you will be paid from it. Since the ox was stoned, there is nothing from which he can collect payment.

Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak said: Rabbi Akiva’s interpretation is applicable in a case where its owner slaughtered it first, before it was sentenced to stoning. Lest you say that the slave’s owner should be paid from the value of the flesh, the verse teaches us that since the ox was subject to be killed, although its owner slaughtered it, the slave’s owner should not be paid from it.

The Gemara asks: If so, why did Rabbi Akiva raise this objection against Rabbi Eliezer’s interpretation? According to Rabbi Eliezer as well, it could be explained as referring to a case where its owner slaughtered it first.

The Gemara answers: Indeed, Rabbi Eliezer’s interpretation could also be explained in this manner. And the reason Rabbi Akiva raised this objection was because he reasons: Perhaps Rabbi Eliezer has another explanation that is better than this one, and will state it. Rabbi Eliezer did in fact respond with another explanation.

The Gemara asks: But let Rabbi Eliezer also answer him that the owner slaughtered it first. Why did he offer a different explanation? The Gemara answers that Rabbi Eliezer could have said to you: Specifically there, in the case Rabbi Eliezer referred to in his explanation, namely, where the ox intended to kill another animal but killed a person instead, since the ox was not subject to be killed at all, it might enter your mind to say that he should be liable to pay half a ransom from the ox’s body. Therefore, the verse is necessary to exclude the owner from liability to pay half a ransom. But here, since the ox was initially subject to be killed, a verse is not necessary to teach that the owner is exempt from paying half a ransom even if he slaughtered it.

The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Akiva also, certainly it is so, that a verse is not necessary to teach that if the owner slaughters the ox before its verdict he is exempt from liability.

Rather, Rav Asi said: The above explanation of Rabbi Akiva’s interpretation should be rejected, as I heard this following statement from a great man, and who is he? He is Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina. This is what he said: It might enter your mind to say that since Rabbi Akiva says in the mishna (33a) that in a case where a person and an innocuous ox damaged each other concurrently, the owner of an innocuous ox that injured a person also pays the full cost of the damage with regard to the difference between the two valuations of the damage, as there is no distinction between an innocuous ox and a forewarned ox with regard to injuries caused to a person, compensation for the slave is also paid from his superior-quality property, not from the body of the ox; just as in a case where a forewarned ox kills a slave. Therefore, its owner cannot say: Bring it to court and you will be paid from it. To counter this possibility, the Merciful One wrote: ''The owner of the ox shall be clear,'' indicating that he is exempt from this liability.

Rabbi Zeira said to Rav Asi: But didn’t Rabbi Akiva already break the force of his fist, i.e., qualify this opinion of his? As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Akiva says: One might have thought that the owner of an innocuous ox that injured a person pays compensation from his superior-quality property, the same as the owner of a forewarned ox. Therefore, the verse states: ''According to this judgment shall be done to him [lo]'' (Exodus 21:31), indicating that he pays restitution exclusively from the body of the ox but he does not pay from his superior-quality property, as the word lo also means: To it. This negates Rav Asi’s explanation of Rabbi Akiva’s interpretation.

Rather, Rava said a different explanation of Rabbi Akiva’s statement: The verse is necessary because it might enter your mind to say that since I, referring to the Torah, am more stringent with regard to a forewarned ox that kills a person in the case of a Canaanite slave than in the case of a freeman; as in the case of a freeman who was worth one sela the owner of the ox gives one sela in ransom, and if he was worth thirty sela he gives thirty; but in the case of a Canaanite slave the Torah imposes a fixed amount, so even if he was worth only one sela the owner gives thirty sela, therefore, since the Torah is more stringent in the case of a slave, payment for the slave should also be paid from the owner’s superior-quality property. To counter this, the Merciful One writes: ''The owner of the ox shall be clear,'' indicating that payment is not required in a case where an innocuous ox kills a slave.

It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the explanation of Rava to Rabbi Akiva’s statement. The baraita states that with regard to the verse ''The owner of the ox shall be clear,'' Rabbi Akiva says: He shall be clear from payment for a Canaanite slave.

Rabbi Akiva discusses this interpretation: And could this halakha not be derived through logical inference, without the verse? Since the Torah deemed him liable to pay for the killing of a slave and deemed him liable for the killing of a freeman as well, just as when the Torah deemed him liable for a freeman you distinguished between an innocuous ox and a forewarned ox, as no ransom is paid in the case of an innocuous ox, so too, when the Torah deemed him liable for a slave, let us distinguish between an innocuous ox and a forewarned ox.

Furthermore, this halakha could be proven through an a fortiori inference: If, in the case of a freeman, where he, the owner, gives his full value, you distinguished between an innocuous ox and a forewarned ox, with regard to a slave, where he gives only thirty sela and not more, even if the slave was worth more, is it not logical that we should distinguish between an innocuous ox and a forewarned ox, and exempt him from liability for an innocuous ox?

Rabbi Akiva rejects this opinion: No, one could disagree and say the opposite: I, referring to the Torah, am more stringent with regard to the case of a slave than with regard to that of a freeman; as for a freeman worth one sela, the ox’s owner gives only one sela, and if he is worth thirty sela he gives thirty. But in the case of a slave, even if he was worth only one sela, he gives thirty sela. Therefore, one might have thought that he should be liable to pay for a slave killed by his innocuous ox. To counter this, the verse states: ''The owner of the ox shall be clear,'' indicating that he shall be clear from paying compensation for a slave.

§ The Sages taught: The verse states with regard to a forewarned ox: ''But if the ox was a goring ox in time past and warning has been given to its owner, and he has not secured it; and it killed a man or a woman; the ox shall be stoned'' (Exodus 21:29). Rabbi Akiva said: And what does this come to teach us? If it is to deem the owner liable for the killing of a woman just as for the killing of a man, this is already stated with regard to an innocuous ox, where it is stated: ''When an ox gores a man or a woman, and they die, the ox shall be stoned'' (Exodus 21:28).

Rather, the verse is stated to compare a woman to a man with regard to another issue: Just as with regard to a man, payment for his injuries is paid to his heirs, so too, with regard to a woman, payment for her injuries is paid to her heirs, and not to her husband.

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Akiva hold that a husband does not inherit from his wife? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: The verse states: ''And he shall inherit it [otah]'' (Numbers 27:11). From here it is derived that the husband inherits from his wife, as otah also means: Her. This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.

Reish Lakish said: Rabbi Akiva says that her heirs and not her husband receive the payment only with regard to ransom, since it is paid only posthumously and is therefore considered property due to her; and the husband does not take in inheritance the property due to the deceased as he does the property she possessed. For instance, an inheritance that would have gone to the woman had she been alive is not awarded to the husband, but rather, to her other heirs.

What is the reason for the assumption that even if it is clear that the victim is about to die, the husband is not owed ransom? The verse states: ''And it killed a man or a woman; the ox shall be stoned, and its owner also shall be put to death. If a ransom is laid on him, then he shall give for the redemption of his life whatsoever is laid on him'' (Exodus 21:29–30), indicating that the owner’s liability to pay ransom is dependent on the ox’s liability to be stoned, which, in turn, applies only after the death of the victim.

The Gemara asks: And with regard to damages, did Rabbi Akiva not say that damages due to a wife are paid to her heirs and not to her husband, just as with regard to ransom?

But isn’t it taught in a baraita: If an assailant struck the woman and her offspring emerged due to miscarriage, he gives compensation for damage and pain to the woman and compensation for miscarried offspring to the husband. If the husband is not alive, he gives the compensation for the offspring to his heirs. If the woman is not alive, he gives the payment owed to her to her heirs. If she was a Canaanite maidservant and then she was emancipated,