The Gemara asks: And according to the understanding of Rav Sheshet, that the baraita is disqualifying one whose field was stolen from testifying on behalf of one who purchased the field from the robber, why is it necessary to discuss a case involving a buyer, when it would be simpler to establish it with regard to testifying for the robber himself?

The Gemara answers: The tanna of the baraita discusses a case involving a buyer because he wants to teach the latter clause: If he sold a cow to him, or if he sold a cloak to him, he can testify about it for the buyer. As in this clause, the tanna specifically needs to discuss a case where the robber sold it, because then it is a case of despair by the owners due to the robbery, and there is also a change in possession due to the sale, and the one who was robbed can no longer reclaim the stolen item. He is therefore no longer biased in his testimony and can testify for the one who purchased the item. But in the latter clause, if the robber did not sell it, in which case the stolen item is returned to the robbery victim, he cannot testify, as he prefers that the item be in the possession of the robber, so that he can recover it from him. Therefore, the tanna taught in the first clause as well about a case where he sold it.

The Gemara asks: And in the latter clause as well, where there is despair and change in possession, granted that he despairs of recovering the item itself, but did he despair of being reimbursed for its value? While it is true that he lost his ownership of the item, he is still entitled to payment. Therefore, he is still biased in his testimony. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary in a case where the robber died, in which case the robbery victim cannot collect even the value of the stolen item, and is no longer biased in his testimony. As we learned in a mishna (Bava Kamma 111b): In the case of one who robs another of food and feeds it to his own children, or who left a stolen item to them as an inheritance, the children are exempt from paying the victim of the robbery after their father’s death. Since he is no longer able to collect the value of the stolen item, he is not biased in his testimony and can testify on behalf of the buyer.

The Gemara asks: And why not establish the entire baraita with regard to testifying for the robber’s heir? This would demonstrate the contrast that the tanna wanted to teach. In the case of a stolen field, which always must be returned to its owner, the robbery victim is biased in his testimony because the field can be recovered. Therefore, it is in his interest to establish that it is in the possession of the robber’s heirs. In the case of movable property, which cannot be recovered after the death of the robber, he is not biased in his testimony.

The Gemara notes: This works out well according to the one who says that the transfer of an item to the possession of an heir is not like the transfer of an item to the possession of a buyer, but is viewed as an extension of the possession of the legator. According to this opinion, it is well that the baraita did not establish its case with regard to the robber’s heir, as the robbery victim would be able to recover the item, and would be considered biased in his testimony. But according to the one who says that the transfer of an item to the possession of an heir is like the transfer of an item to the possession of a buyer, and the item is not recoverable in either case, what can be said to explain why the baraita does not state its case with regard to an heir?

And furthermore, this explanation was difficult for Abaye to understand, as according to Rav Sheshet’s explanation, is it accurate to state, as the baraita does, that the distinction exists between the cases of land and movable property because in the first clause the financial responsibility to compensate the buyer for the land is upon him, and in the latter clause the financial responsibility to compensate the buyer for the movable property is not upon him? That is not the crucial distinction. The tanna should have taught instead that the difference is: Here he cannot testify because the stolen field returns to him, and here he can testify because the stolen item does not return to him.

The Gemara offers a new explanation of the baraita: Rather, explain instead in accordance with the statement of Ravin bar Shmuel, as Ravin bar Shmuel says in the name of Shmuel: One who sells a field to another even without a guarantee that if the field will be repossessed the seller will compensate the buyer for his loss cannot testify with regard to ownership of that field on behalf of the buyer, because he is establishing the field before his creditor.

The Gemara clarifies this by noting: And this is the case specifically in the case of a house or a field. But in the case of a cow or a cloak, he is not biased in his testimony, and can testify on behalf of the buyer. The Gemara explains: It is not necessary to say that this is the halakha