Come and hear a resolution of the dilemma from the following baraita: When did they say that if the husband died the authority to nullify a young woman’s vows reverts to the father? When the husband did not hear the vow; or he heard the vow and nullified it; or heard it, and was silent, and died on that day. And if you say that divorce is like silence, let the tanna of the baraita also teach with regard to the husband: Or he heard the vow and divorced her. From the fact that he did not teach this case, learn from the baraita that divorce is like ratification.

The Gemara rejects the proof from the baraita: State the latter clause of the baraita: But if he heard it and ratified it; or he heard it, and was silent, and died on the following day, then the father cannot nullify the vow. But according to this clause, if you say that divorce is like ratification, let the tanna of the baraita also teach: And if he heard the vow and divorced her. Rather, from the fact that the baraita does not teach this, learn from the baraita that divorce is like silence.

Rather, one cannot learn anything from this baraita about the effect of divorce on her vows. The Gemara explains that the discrepancy between the two clauses is stylistic and can be explained either way: If the cases in the first clause are chosen precisely, allowing for the inference that divorce is like ratification, then one must say that the tanna formulates the last clause of the baraita as he does because of the first clause, i.e., in the same style, although it does not add anything. If the cases in the last clause are chosen precisely, allowing for the inference that divorce is like silence, then one must say that the tanna formulates the first clause of the baraita as he does because of the last clause, i.e., in the same style, although it does not add anything.

Come and hear a mishna (71a): If she took a vow while she was betrothed, and was divorced, and was betrothed again on the same day, even to one hundred men, her father and her final husband nullify her vows. Learn from this mishna that divorce is like silence, because if it were like ratification, could the final betrothed nullify vows that the first betrothed had already ratified?

The Gemara rejects this proof: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case in which the first betrothed man did not hear the vow, and for that reason his divorcing her does not constitute ratification. The Gemara then asks: If so, why mention specifically that the divorce occurred on that day? The same would hold true even after one hundred days as well. Since the first husband never heard the vow, the final husband can nullify it on whichever day he hears it.

The Gemara answers: It is referring to a situation in which the betrothed man did not hear the vow but the father heard it. As in that case, it is only on the same day that he can nullify the vow, but he cannot nullify it from this point forward. Once her father has already heard the vow, her betrothed cannot nullify it on a different day. Therefore, one cannot infer from the mishna that divorce is like silence.

Come and hear a resolution of the dilemma from a mishna (89a): If she took a vow on that day, and he divorced her and remarried her on the same day, he cannot nullify her vow. Learn from the mishna that divorce is like ratification.

The Gemara rejects this proof: Say that here, i.e., in the mishna cited, we are dealing with a married woman, and that is the reason that he cannot nullify the vow. It is not because it has been ratified by divorce but because the husband cannot nullify his wife’s vows that precede their marriage. The dilemma remains unresolved.