However, if his declaration that the food is ownerless predates his vow, it is permitted for the other person to eat the food. And if you say that the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei is because the food remains in the possession of the owner until it comes into the possession of the one who acquires it, what is different for me if his vow predates his declaration that the food is ownerless, and what is different for me if his declaration that the food is ownerless predates his vow? In any event, the item remains in the possession of its owner and the one for whom benefit is forbidden benefits from it.

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Abba raised the objection and he answered that objection. The difference between the cases does not relate to the halakhot of ownerless property; rather, it relates to the nature of vows. The intent of anyone who vows is that the vow not apply to an item that he rendered ownerless. Therefore, when he declares the food ownerless and then vows, he does not intend to include the ownerless food in his vow, and the prohibition does not take effect upon it.

Rava raised an objection: With regard to a person on his deathbed who ordered his executor to distribute all his property, if he recovers, he may retract the gift. However, if he ordered him to distribute only a portion of his property and kept the rest, he cannot retract the gift. If he ordered him to distribute his property to two people and said: A portion of the property is given to the first person and all of the remaining property is given to the second person, then if he recovered, the first person acquired the property that was given him, as it was a partial gift.

And the second person did not acquire the property that was given him, as it was a gift of all his remaining property, which can be retracted. Although the first person did not yet acquire the property, as the person on his deathbed did not die, the property is no longer considered to be in the possession of the one who owned it. This is clear from the fact that if it were still in his possession, the gift to the second person would not be a gift of all his remaining property. This contradicts the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said in explanation of the opinion of Rabbi Yosei: Acquisition of a gift is not complete until the item comes from the possession of the one who gives the gift into the possession of the one who receives the gift.

Rather, Rava said that this is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei: It is prohibited by rabbinic decree for the one for whom benefit is forbidden to take food that was declared ownerless, due to the gift of Beit Ḥoron. An incident occurred in Beit Ḥoron involving a person who employed artifice and gave a gift to another to circumvent a vow. The Sages ruled that artifice of that sort is forbidden. Here too, when he renounced ownership he merely employed artifice to circumvent the vow.

It is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who declares his field ownerless, for the entire three days after that declaration he is able to retract it. From this point forward, he is unable to retract the declaration.