that if she said: No, it would also be a betrothal. But why should that be the case? After all, she said: No. Rather, is it not to be explained in this manner, i.e., that the phrase: She wanted, means she said yes, and: She did not want, means that she remained silent. And one can learn from this that silence after the money is given is nothing. Her silence is not interpreted as an agreement to the betrothal.

In the city of Pum Nahara they raised a difficulty against Rava’s proof, in the name of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua: Is it comparable? There, in the baraita, he gave her the money as a deposit but they are his. She therefore thinks: If I throw them and they break I will be obligated to pay for them, as would anyone who destroys another person’s property. Consequently, her silence is interpreted as consent only to continue in her role of holding it as a deposit. By contrast, here he gives them to her as betrothal money so that they would belong to her. And if it is so, that she is not amenable to being betrothed, let her throw them away.

Rav Aḥai refutes this argument: Is that to say that all women are learned in halakha? In this case also, she thinks: If I throw them and they break I will be responsible for them. Therefore, I will not throw them. One cannot deduce from the fact that she does not throw the coins that she accepted them as betrothal money. Rav Aḥa bar Rav, sent this question to Ravina: In a case like this, what is the halakha? Ravina sent the following response to him: We did not hear this statement of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua. Therefore, we do not need to take it into consideration. You, who heard it, should be concerned about a possible betrothal.

§ The Gemara further relates: There was a certain woman who was selling belts. A certain man came and snatched a belt [varshekha] from her. She said to him: Give it to me. He said to her: If I give it to you will you be betrothed to me? She took it and was silent, and Rav Naḥman said: She could say: Yes, I took it, but I took my property. There is no proof that she agreed to accept it as a betrothal.

Rava raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Naḥman from a baraita: If a man betrothed a woman with property that was taken by robbery; or with property taken by a forced transaction, when the owner was reluctant to sell, or with property that was taken by theft; or if he grabbed a sela from her hand and betrothed her with it, she is betrothed. If so, why does Rav Naḥman say here that when he took it from her and betrothed her she is not betrothed? Rav Naḥman answered: There, it is referring to a case where he had previously arranged to marry her, and therefore if she remained silent she certainly agreed to the betrothal.

And from where do you say that there is a difference between a case where he had previously arranged to marry her and where he had not arranged to do so? As it is taught in a baraita that with regard to a man who said to a woman: Take this sela that I owe you, and he went back and said to her: Be betrothed to me with it, if he said this at the time the money was given and she wanted it, she is betrothed; if she did not want it, she is not betrothed. If he issued his statement after the money was given, then even if she wanted it, she is not betrothed.

Rav Naḥman clarifies: What is the meaning of: She wanted, and what is the meaning of: She did not want? If we say that: She wanted, means that she said yes, and: She did not want, means that she explicitly said no, it can be inferred that if she was silent it is a valid betrothal. But if so, let the baraita teach simply that she is betrothed, without specification, as it did there in the previous case, with regard to one who said: Take this sela as a deposit. It is obvious that if she explicitly said no, she is not betrothed.

Rather, the phrase: She wanted, means she said yes, and: She did not want, means that she remained silent. And in this case of silence the baraita taught that she is not betrothed. What is the reason that she is not betrothed if she remained silent? It is that she can say: Yes I took it, but I took my own property and did not intend to become betrothed.

But this is difficult with regard to that which we learned, that if a man betrothed her with property that was taken by robbery, or with property taken by a forced transaction, or with property that was taken by theft, or if he grabbed a sela from her hand and betrothed her with it, she is betrothed. Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from it that this ruling, that she is betrothed if she was silent, is referring to a case where he arranged the marriage beforehand, whereas this ruling, that she is not betrothed when she remained silent, is referring to a situation where he did not arrange it beforehand?

§ The Gemara relates: When Rabbi Asi died, the Sages assembled to collect his statements, i.e., they wished to review his rulings of halakha lest they be forgotten. A certain member of the Sages, and Rabbi Ya’akov was his name, said to them: This is what Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Mani said: Just as a woman cannot be acquired by less than the value of one peruta, so too land cannot be acquired by less than the value of one peruta. They said to him: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Although a woman cannot be acquired by less than the value of one peruta, land can be acquired by less than the value of one peruta?

Rabbi Ya’akov said to them: When that baraita is taught to the effect that land can be acquired by less than the value of one peruta but a woman cannot, it was with regard to acquisition through symbolic exchange, i.e., a legal act of acquisition formalizing the transfer of ownership of an article. As it is taught in a baraita: One can acquire land and movable items through a symbolic exchange by giving a vessel, even though it is not worth one peruta.

They then sat and said additional statements in the name of Rabbi Asi. One statement concerned that which Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: Anyone who does not know the nature of bills of divorce and betrothals should have no dealings in them, as his ignorance might lead people to commit serious sins. In this context, Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: And those who deal with these issues without proper knowledge are worse for the world than the generation of the flood, as it is stated: ''Swearing and lying, and killing, and stealing, and committing adultery. They break all bounds, and blood touches blood'' (Hosea 4:2).

The Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred that this verse is referring to individuals of this kind and that they are worse for the world than the generation of the flood? The Gemara explains: As Rav Yosef translated the phrase ''and committing adultery, they break all bounds, and blood touches blood,'' as: They give birth to children through the wives of others; they add sins upon sins.

And it is written in the next verse: ''Therefore the land mourns and everyone who dwells there languishes, with the beasts of the field and the fowls of heaven, and the fishes of the sea are also taken away'' (Hosea 4:3). This indicates that those who cause illegitimate children to be born lead to such a great tragedy that even the fish of the sea will die, whereas in the generation of the flood the decree was not imposed upon the fish in the sea, as it is stated: ''Whatever was on dry land died'' (Genesis 7:22). The explicit mention of dry land indicates that the fish in the sea did not die. But here, in the punishment described in the verses in Hosea, even the fish in the sea died.

The Gemara asks: But one can say that this punishment is not administered until they perform all of them, i.e., only if they commit all of the sins mentioned in the verse, including taking false oaths, committing murder, and stealing. The Gemara answers: It should not enter your mind to say this, as it is written: ''For because of swearing the land mourns'' (Jeremiah 23:10). This verse teaches that on account of taking false oaths alone the world can be destroyed, from which it may be inferred that each these acts on its own is enough to warrant destruction.

The Gemara further asks: But one can say that taking a false oath is distinct, as it involves the desecration of God’s name, and these other sins are distinct, i.e., they are less severe offenses that entail a less serious punishment. Therefore, it is possible that this great tragedy will result only if one performs all of them.