It is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says: Verbal directives cannot be delegated to an agent, and there is no concern that the scribe signed the document without the husband instructing him to do so.

And if it enters your mind to say that Rabbi Yosei concedes in the case of one who says: Tell another to write it, a pitfall will result from it. As sometimes, it happens that one said to two people: Tell a scribe and he will write the document and tell so-and-so and so-and-so and they will sign it. And due to the shame of the scribe, who asks: Don’t you consider me a sufficiently upright person to sign the document as a witness, the agents are concerned to avoid that disgrace and they will have one of those witnesses and the scribe sign together with him, and the husband did not say to do so. This bill of divorce is invalid because it was signed contrary to the husband’s instructions, and the agents will mistakenly think it is valid.

The reason that this is not a concern must be because Rabbi Yosei holds that even if the husband says to the agents: Tell the scribe to write, the bill of divorce is not valid. Rather, it is clear that the first clause of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir and the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.

Rav Ashi said an alternative explanation of the attribution of the mishna: The mishna in its entirety is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said that verbal directives cannot be delegated to an agent, and it is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary, as follows: It is not necessary to state that the bill of divorce is not valid in a case where he did not say to the agents: Give the document to my wife; rather, even if he said to the agents: Give the bill of divorce to my wife, the document is not valid. And it is not necessary to state the halakha in a case where the husband did not say his instructions to three people; rather, even if he said his instructions to three people, no, the bill of divorce is not valid. And it is not necessary to state the halakha in a case where the husband did not say to the agents: Say my instructions to a scribe, but even if he said: Say my instructions to a scribe, the bill of divorce is also not valid.

The Gemara notes: It is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 2:7–8) in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ashi that Rabbi Yosei invalidated the bill of divorce even if the husband said: Tell my instructions to a scribe, as it is taught: If the scribe wrote the bill of divorce for her sake and the witnesses signed it for her sake then even though they wrote it, and they signed it, and they gave it to the husband and he gave it to his wife, the bill of divorce is void until they hear the husband’s voice when he says to the scribe: Write the document for the sake of my wife, and to the witnesses: Sign the document for the sake of my wife.

The inference from the baraita is that it uses the term: Until they hear, serves to exclude the opinion of the one who said: Rabbi Yosei concedes in a case where the husband says: Say my instructions to the scribe; because the scribe and the witnesses must hear the husband themselves. Furthermore, the baraita uses the term: His voice, to exclude that which Rav Kahana says that Rav says, that a husband may issue written instructions to the scribe and witnesses. According to the baraita the instructions must be verbal.

MISHNA: If one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce if I die, or: This is your bill of divorce if I die from this illness, or: This is your bill of divorce after my death, then it is as if he said nothing, since a bill of divorce is valid only if it takes effect before the husband’s death. But if the husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from today if I die, or: This is your bill of divorce from now if I die, then this is a valid bill of divorce, because once he dies, the bill of divorce retroactively applies from when he made this statement.

If the husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from today and after my death, then it is uncertain whether his primary intention was for the bill of divorce to take effect that day, in which case it is a valid bill of divorce, or if his primary intention was that it should take effect after his death and is therefore not valid. The halakha is that there is uncertainty whether it is a valid bill of divorce or not a valid bill of divorce. And if he dies without children his wife must perform ḥalitza, since perhaps the bill of divorce is not valid and she is bound by the levirate bond and may not remarry without first performing ḥalitza. But she may not enter into levirate marriage, since perhaps the bill of divorce is valid, and it is prohibited for a divorcée to marry her brother-in-law.

If he said: This is your bill of divorce from today if I die from this illness, and he recovered, and he arose and walked in the market, but then became ill again and died, the court assesses him. If he died because of the first illness then this is a valid bill of divorce, as his conditional statement was fulfilled, but if not, i.e., if he was cured from the first illness and died from another illness, then it is not a valid bill of divorce.

GEMARA: The mishna teaches: If one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce if I die, then it is as if he said nothing. The Gemara deduces: Apparently, the formulation: If I die, is considered to be like the formulation: The bill of divorce will be valid only after my death. And afterward the mishna teaches: If he said: This is your bill of divorce from today if I die, or: This is your bill of divorce from now if I die, then this is a valid bill of divorce. Apparently, the formulation: If I die, is not considered to be like the formulation: The bill of divorce will be valid only after my death. As explained previously in the mishna, a bill of divorce which takes effect only after the husband’s death is not a valid bill of divorce. There is an apparent contradiction as to the meaning of the term: If I die.

Abaye said: The expression: If I die, indicates two different meanings. It indicates the same meaning as one who says: From now, i.e., that the bill of divorce will take effect after death retroactively from now. And it indicates the same meaning as one who says: After my death, i.e., that the bill of divorce will take effect only after his death.

If the husband said to his wife: From today if I die, it is considered to be like one who says to her: From now, conditional upon my death. But if he did not say to her: From today, it is considered to be like one who says to her: After my death, and the bill of divorce is void because it takes effect only after his death.

§ The mishna teaches that if one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce if I die, then it is as if he said nothing. Rav Huna says: But if her husband died without children this woman must perform ḥalitza and not enter into a levirate marriage because perhaps it is a valid bill of divorce.

The Gemara raises a challenge: But isn’t the expression: It is as if he said nothing, taught in the mishna? The Gemara answers: The mishna means that it is as if he said nothing with regard to the fact that she is still forbidden to everyone after the death of her husband, and is bound by a levirate bond. And she is also forbidden to the yavam because perhaps the bill of divorce was valid, in which case she has no levirate bond.

The Gemara raises a challenge: But since the latter clause of the mishna teaches that in those cases of uncertainty she must perform ḥalitza, by inference it appears that in the cases of the first clause she may also enter into levirate marriage, indicating that in those cases the bill of divorce is definitely not valid. The Gemara answers: This is not a challenge to Rav Huna’s opinion, as the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis that this kind of conditional bill of divorce is invalid and she may enter into levirate marriage.

But Rav Huna was not explaining the words of the mishna; the statement that he said is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says as a principle: The date written in a document proves when it takes effect. Therefore, since the bill of divorce bears that day’s date, it takes effect immediately, even though it is not stated explicitly.

The Gemara challenges: If Rav Huna’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei then the woman should also not require ḥalitza, as in his opinion the bill of divorce is entirely valid and there is no levirate bond at all. And if you would say that Rav Huna is uncertain if the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei or if the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and on account of this he was stringent in accordance with both opinions, i.e., the one which requires ḥalitza and the one which forbids levirate marriage, this also presents a difficulty. But is Rav Huna in fact uncertain?

But when Rabba bar Avuh was ill Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman entered to visit him. Rav Huna said to Rav Naḥman: Ask of him, Rabba bar Avuh: Is the halakha in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei or is the halakha not in accordance with his opinion? Rav Naḥman said to Rav Huna: I do not know the reason for the opinion held by Rabbi Yosei, and you ask me to ask Rabba bar Avuh the halakha? Rav Huna said to Rav Naḥman: You ask him the halakha, and I will tell you the reason for the opinion held by Rabbi Yosei afterward.

Rav Naḥman asked of Rabba bar Avuh what the halakha is. Rabba bar Avuh said to him: So said Rav: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. After he left Rav Huna said to Rav Naḥman: This is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, as he holds: The date written in a document proves when it takes effect. From this incident it is clear that Rav Huna holds that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, as Rav Huna certainly accepted the opinion that Rabba bar Avuh said in the name of Rav. Rather, it is necessary to say that Rav Huna is uncertain