isn’t there a need to write it, as the verse states with regard to the frontplate: ''Wrote upon it a writing, like the engravings of a signet'' (Exodus 39:30), and there is no writing here? The Gemara answers: It means that the frontplate was fashioned like the form of gold dinars but not entirely like the form of gold dinars. It was fashioned like the form of gold dinars in that the writing protrudes. But it was not fashioned like the form of gold dinars entirely, as there, in the case of gold dinars, the pressing of the stamp is done from the inside, by pushing back the surrounding area to allow the form to be visible, and here, when fashioning the frontplate, it was done from the outside, by applying pressure to the opposite side so that the letters were pushed outward. Since the letters were carved directly, it was considered to be writing.

§ Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: In the case of a husband who wrote for her a bill of divorce on a plate [tas] of gold and said to her: Receive your bill of divorce and also receive the payment of your marriage contract through this act, as the piece of gold is worth enough to pay for the value of her marriage contract, what is the halakha? Rav Naḥman said to him: Her bill of divorce has been received and the payment of her marriage contract has been received.

Rava raised an objection to his statement from a baraita: If a husband gave his wife a bill of divorce on an oversized paper and said to her: Receive your bill of divorce, and the remainder of the paper, on which nothing is written, is designated for the payment of your marriage contract, then her bill of divorce has been received and the remainder should be for the payment of her marriage contract.

The Gemara explains the objection: This indicates that the reason why the material upon which the bill of divorce is written may also serve as the payment for her marriage contract is that there is the remainder of the paper, on which the bill of divorce was not written. If there is not the remainder of the paper, then no, the bill of divorce may not serve as payment of the marriage contract. This is because the husband must give the bill of divorce to his wife for it to become hers. If so, even if the bill of divorce was written on a plate of gold, if there was no part of the plate of gold other than the space where the bill of divorce was written, it should not serve as payment of her marriage contract.

Rav Naḥman responded: The same is true although there is no remainder of the paper, and he wrote the bill of divorce on the entire paper. And by stating the halakha in a case where there was an additional part of the paper, the baraita teaches us this: Although there is the remainder of the paper upon which nothing is written, if he explicitly said to her that it should be for the payment of her marriage contract, yes, it is considered to be a payment for her marriage contract. If he did not say this explicitly, then no, it is not for the payment of her marriage contract, and he must give her the value of her marriage contract in its entirety through a separate payment.

The Gemara explains: What is the reason for this? If he did not explicitly say that the remainder of the paper is designated toward the payment of her marriage contract, then the remainder is considered to be the margin around the border of the scroll, and all of the paper constitutes the bill of divorce. Therefore, it is necessary to inform her that the remainder of the paper is for the payment of her marriage contract.

The Sages taught: If the husband said to his wife: Behold this is your bill of divorce, but the paper on which it is written is still mine, then she is not divorced, as he must give her the actual bill of divorce in order for the divorce to take effect. Since the paper still belongs to him, it is as if he had given her only the writing. But if he said to her: Behold this is your bill of divorce on the condition that you return the paper to me, then she is divorced. The bill of divorce belongs entirely to her, and the returning of the paper is only a stipulation that must be fulfilled later.

Rav Pappa raises a dilemma: If he said that the paper between each line or between each word in the bill of divorce will still belong to him but the paper where the words are written will be hers, what is the halakha? A solution is not found for this question, and the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

The Gemara asks: Why isn’t a solution offered for Rav Pappa’s question? Let him derive an answer to this question from elsewhere, as the Merciful One speaks of one scroll in regard to the bill of divorce in the Torah: ''And he writes her a scroll of severance'' (Deuteronomy 24:1), and not two or three scrolls. If the woman receives only the paper on which the words are written but the rest of the paper belongs to the man, then this is not viewed as a single scroll. Rather, it is multiple scrolls, thereby invalidating it. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to discuss the question in a case where the letters are intertwined, meaning that they were written in such a manner that even if the paper between them was removed, the writing in the bill of divorce would remain attached as a single entity.

Rami bar Ḥama raises a dilemma: If the judges had a presumption that a slave was his, i.e., that it belonged to the husband; and the bill of divorce that this man gave his wife was written on that slave’s hand; and now the slave emerges from her possession, i.e., he is with the woman, what is the halakha with regard to this bill of divorce?

The Gemara explains the elements of the question: Do we say that the husband transferred the slave to his wife? Therefore, it is as though he gave her the bill of divorce in the proper manner, as is explained in the mishna, and she is divorced. Or perhaps we say that he, the slave, entered the possession of the woman on his own, because he prefers to be under her ownership rather than under her husband’s ownership, in which case the husband did not give him to the woman at all, and she is not divorced, as the husband needs to give the bill of divorce to the woman?

Rava said: And let Rami bar Ḥama derive an answer to his question from a different reason, that writing on a person’s body is writing that can be forged, as it is easily erased and replaced with other writing, and a bill of divorce that is written in a manner susceptible to forgery is invalid. The Gemara clarifies: But according to Rava, who raised this challenge, the mishna is difficult, as it taught that a bill of divorce may be written on a slave’s hand.

The Gemara responds: Granted, the mishna is not difficult for Rava, as it is possible to say that the mishna is referring to a case where the husband gave her the slave with witnesses present who observe the transmission of a legal document. In other words, they were present when the slave, who has the legal document written on him, was given to the woman. And it is in accordance with Rabbi Elazar, who holds that the essential witnesses are those who witness the delivery, and since they witnessed the delivery, she is divorced. However, for Rami bar Ḥama it is difficult. In his case, there were no witnesses to the transfer of the slave, so the possibility that the writing was forged should invalidate it.

The Gemara answers: According to Rami bar Ḥama it is also not difficult, as he did not ask his question in a case where the bill of divorce was written on the slave with ink but with regard to a case where it was written as a tattoo, so the writing certainly cannot be erased and forged. The Gemara notes: Now that you have arrived at this, the mishna, which deemed valid a bill of divorce that was written on the hand of the slave, will not be difficult for Rava either, as it is also stating the halakha with regard to a case where it was written as a tattoo.

In any case, Rami bar Ḥama’s question remains unresolved. If so, what halakhic conclusion was reached about this matter? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof based on that which Reish Lakish says: With regard to livestock, there is no presumption of ownership, since they wander from place to place. Therefore, a person cannot claim that his mere possession of livestock demonstrates ownership, because they may have wandered into his property on their own. The same halakha should apply to a slave. If there are no witnesses who saw the transfer to the woman, then her mere possession of the slave should not serve as proof that the slave, and by extension the bill of divorce, was given to her, and consequently the woman is not divorced.

Rami bar Ḥama raises another dilemma: If the judges had a presumption that a slate was hers, and a bill of divorce was written on it, and now this slate emerges from his possession, and he wants to divorce his wife by giving her the slate, what is the halakha? Do we say that she transferred the ownership of the slate to him, and he may give it to her as a bill of divorce, and the divorce takes effect? Or perhaps a woman does not understand how to transfer an object that will be given back to her, and she believes it is a formality and not an actual legal transfer. If this were to be the case, they would not be divorced, as the slate did not in fact belong to the husband.

Abaye said: Come and hear a proof based on what is stated in a mishna (Eduyyot 2:3): Even he, Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava, who was quoted earlier in this mishna, testified about a small village that was adjacent to Jerusalem, and there was an old man there who would lend money to all the residents of the village. And he would write the documents in his handwriting and others would sign. And the incident came before the Sages and they deemed it valid. And why did they deem it valid? Isn’t there a need to fulfill this verse: ''I took the deed of purchase'' (Jeremiah 32:11), requiring that the document itself be transferred from the seller to the buyer, and this is not the case here, as the document attesting to the loan was in the possession of the creditor the entire time?

Rather, is it not because we say that he certainly transferred the ownership of the documents to them in a legally binding manner, although he knew that they would be returned to him immediately afterward. The same should apply in this case, and the assumption should be that the woman transferred ownership of the slate to the husband, and he then gave it back to her.

Rava said: And what is the difficulty? How can one prove anything from the mishna? Perhaps