when they are purchased by their owner, if the owner explicitly consecrated it as a burnt-offering or sin-offering when he purchased it, or through the actions of the priest when he offers the birds as sacrifices. Therefore, even if the women did not verbalize their intentions, it is considered as if they had made a stipulation from the outset. Therefore, this case is not an instance of retroactive designation.

And still the question may be raised: Does Rabbi Yosei really hold that there is no retroactive designation? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: If an am ha’aretz, who is not known to be scrupulous in separating tithes, said to a ḥaver, one known to be meticulous in his observance of halakha and especially the laws of teruma and tithes, before the ḥaver went to the market to buy himself vegetables from another am ha’aretz: Buy for me as well a bundle of vegetables or a cake [geluska], the ḥaver does not need to tithe the food that he gives to the am ha’aretz. The only reason the food needs to be tithed is because it is demai, and an am ha’aretz is not particular about that issue. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei. It can be deduced from this ruling that Rabbi Yosei accepts the principle of retroactive designation, as the ḥaver purchased bundles of vegetables without specifying which was for himself and which was for the am ha’aretz, and when he gave one to the am ha’aretz, it became retroactively clear that he had purchased that bundle for the am ha’aretz from the start, and therefore he does not need to separate tithes from it as demai.

And the Rabbis say: He must tithe it. Since we do not accept the principle of retroactive designation, everything that the ḥaver bought was bought for himself, and the fact that he later gave part of it to the am ha’aretz does not exempt him from his original obligation to separate tithes from the demai. In any case, it seems that Rabbi Yosei’s opinion in this baraita contradicts his opinion in the Tosefta cited above with regard to wine. The Gemara answers: Reverse the opinions in the baraita and say that according to Rabbi Yosei he must tithe the produce he gives to the am ha’aretz, while the Rabbis permit him to proceed without tithing.

The Gemara attempts to bring another proof. Come and hear a proof from a different Tosefta: In the case of one who says: The second tithe that I have in my house shall be redeemed upon the sela coin that will happen to come up in my hand when I remove it from the pouch, i.e., he did not have a particular coin in mind, Rabbi Yosei says: The second tithe is redeemed. When the coin is removed from the pouch, it is retroactively clarified that this is the coin that he had in his mind from the outset. This indicates that Rabbi Yosei accepts the principle of retroactive designation.

The Gemara answers again: Reverse the attributions, and say that Rabbi Yosei says: He has not redeemed the second tithe. The Gemara raises a difficulty: What did you see that you reversed two sources because of one, and made the two baraitot conform to the mishna, which indicates that Rabbi Yosei holds that there is no retroactive designation? Perhaps I should reverse one source, i.e., the mishna, because of the two baraitot and say that in fact Rabbi Yosei accepts the principle of retroactive designation, and it is the lone source that indicates otherwise that must be revised.

The Gemara answers: This Tosefta was certainly taught in reverse, as the latter clause states: And Rabbi Yosei concedes with regard to one who says: The second tithe that I have in my house shall be redeemed with the new sela coin that will happen to come up in my hand when I remove it from the pouch, that he has redeemed the second tithe. The Gemara makes the following inference: From the fact that it said here that he has redeemed the second tithe, it can be proven by inference that there, in the first clause of the Tosefta, he did not redeem the second tithe. Therefore, the wording found in the earlier part of the baraita is clearly incorrect and must be reversed.

The Gemara raises a question with regard to the halakha cited in the Tosefta: This new sela, what are its circumstances? If it is referring to a situation where there are two or three coins in his pouch, so that it is not clear which coin he is referring to, and there is the possibility of retroactive designation, this is exactly the same as the first case. Why does he rule here, as opposed to the earlier case, that there is retroactive designation? Rather, it must refer to a situation where he has only one coin in his pouch. But if so, what is the meaning of the expression: Will happen to come up?

The Gemara answers: In fact, it is referring to a case where one has only one coin in his pouch, and the wording of the latter clause is imprecise. Since the first clause taught the halakha using this expression: Will happen to come up, the latter clause also taught the halakha using this same expression: Will happen to come up, even though he was referring to the only new coin that he has in his pouch.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: Who is this tanna who does not accept the principle of retroactive designation even concerning rabbinic decrees? As it was taught in a baraita: If one person said to five people: I am hereby establishing an eiruv for whichever one of you I will choose, so that the person I have chosen will be able to walk two thousand cubits from the spot of the eiruv, whereas whomever I have not chosen will not be able to walk two thousand cubits from the location of the eiruv, the following distinction applies: If he chose the person for whom he was making the eiruv before Shabbat, while it was still day, his eiruv is a valid eiruv; but if he only chose him after nightfall, his eiruv is not a valid eiruv. The tanna of this baraita apparently rejects the principle of retroactive designation, even with regard to rabbinic enactments, as if that were not the case, the eiruv should be valid even if he only chose the person for whom he was making the eiruv after nightfall.

Rav Naḥman was silent and did not say anything to Rava. The Gemara asks: And let Rav Naḥman say to him that the baraita is the opinion of a Sage of the school of Ayo, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, which maintains that even with regard to an eiruv there is no retroactive designation. The Gemara answers: He did not accept Ayo’s version of Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion and considered it incorrect.

Rav Yosef said, in his unique style: Have you removed the tanna’im from the world? Is there no tanna who holds this position? The possibility of retroactive designation with regard to rabbinic enactments is a dispute among tanna’im, as it was taught in a baraita: One said: I am hereby establishing an eiruv for the Shabbatot of the entire year, so that if I want to make use of it, I will be able to walk two thousand cubits from the eiruv, and if I do not want to do so, I will not walk. If he wanted to make use of the eiruv for a particular Shabbat while it was still day, his eiruv is a valid eiruv for that Shabbat. However, if he only decided after nightfall that he wanted the eiruv to be in effect, the tanna’im disagree: Rabbi Shimon says: His eiruv is a valid eiruv; and the Rabbis say: His eiruv is not a valid eiruv. This indicates that according to the Rabbis there is no retroactive designation, even with regard to eiruvin, while Rabbi Shimon holds that his eiruv is in effect because of the principle of retroactive designation.

The Gemara asks: Didn’t we hear that Rabbi Shimon does not accept the principle of retroactive designation in the case of wine from Kutim? The contradiction between one ruling of Rabbi Shimon and another ruling of Rabbi Shimon himself is difficult. The Gemara answers: Rather, reverse the opinions and say that it is Rabbi Shimon who holds that his eiruv is not valid, and therefore he can be identified as the tanna who holds that there is no retroactive designation at all, even with regard to rabbinic decrees.

The Gemara asks: What is the difficulty here? Perhaps it is with regard to Torah law that Rabbi Shimon does not accept the principle of retroactive designation, but with regard to rabbinic decrees, he does accept the principle of retroactive designation. Therefore, it is not necessary to reverse the opinions.

The Gemara answers: Rav Yosef holds that one who accepts the principle of retroactive designation accepts it in all cases; there is no difference between Torah law and rabbinic decrees. And one who does not accept the principle of retroactive designation does not accept it at all; there is no difference between Torah law and rabbinic decrees.

Rava said: The distinction between the case of the wine and the other cases is not related to the principle of retroactive designation. Rather, there, the case of the wine of a Kuti, is different, as we require that the teruma be the first of your produce, whose remnants are recognizable. Since teruma is called the first, if it is not clear which portion was separated and which portion is left over, the designation of part of the wine as teruma is not effective, despite the fact that Rabbi Shimon accepts the principle of retroactive designation.

Abaye said to him: Do you really think that this ruling is correct? But if that is so, if there were two pomegranates that were tevel before him, and he said: If rain falls today, this pomegranate shall be teruma for that other pomegranate, and if rain does not fall today, that second pomegranate shall be teruma for this first one, so too, whether rain fell or did not fall, there is no significance to his statement because the remnants that are not teruma are not immediately recognizable.

And if you say that indeed, it is so, there is a difficulty. Didn’t we learn in a mishna that if one says: The teruma of this pile of produce and its tithes shall be inside it, without specifying the location of the produce that he is designating for these purposes, and similarly, if one says about a pile of first-tithe produce: The teruma of this tithe shall be inside it, without specifying the location, Rabbi Shimon says: He has given it a name, i.e., the designation of the teruma and tithes take effect, even though it is impossible to distinguish between them and the permitted portion of the produce? Therefore, it is not necessary for the remnants of the act of separation to be recognizable.

Rava refutes this argument: There, with regard to a pile of produce, it is different because there are recognizable remnants around it. He specified that the teruma should be inside the heap, which indicates that it is in the middle of the pile, and therefore the produce on the perimeter of the pile is certainly not teruma, and some of the remnants of the act of separation are recognizable.

And if you wish, you can reconcile the difference between the case of separating teruma from wine and the other cases and say in accordance with the reason that was taught in the case of the wine: The Rabbis said to Rabbi Meir: Don’t you concede that perhaps the leather flask will burst before he manages to separate the teruma, and retroactively this person would have been drinking tevel? Since he never ended up separating teruma, the wine remained tevel all along. Rabbi Meir said to them: When it bursts, I will consider the matter, but presently I am not concerned that the bottle might burst. Therefore, we see that these tanna’im do not disagree about the principle of retroactive designation but over the likelihood that the flask will burst.

The Gemara now asks: And according to what initially entered our minds, which is that we require teruma that is the first, whose remnants are recognizable what did the Rabbis say to Rabbi Meir about that? That is the objection they should have raised against him.

The Gemara answers: This is what they said to him: According to our own opinion, we require teruma that is the first, whose remnants are recognizable; according to your opinion,