A provisional guilt offering comes for the uncertain consumption of a non-kosher animal carcass. Rava said to him: But didn’t we learn in the mishna: And the Rabbis say that one brings a provisional guilt offering only for uncertain performance of a matter for whose intentional performance one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting performance one is liable to bring a sin offering? But here the consumption of an animal carcass is a violation of a prohibition that does not entail karet or a sin offering. And if you are referring to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, he maintains that a provisional guilt offering comes also as a gift offering, without any uncertain sin.

Rabbi Ḥiyya said to Rava: What is the reason that you did not learn from Rabba? Many times I taught this baraita before the Master. And who is the Master? It is Rabba. And he said to me: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer; nevertheless, it is not in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer’s own opinion that a provisional guilt offering is brought as a gift offering, but rather it is in accordance with the opinion of those who spoke to Bava ben Buta. As we learned in the mishna: But they say to him: Wait until you enter into a situation of potential uncertainty. According to this opinion, one brings a provisional guilt offering for any manner of uncertain sin.

Rava said: What is the reason for the opinion of those who spoke to Bava ben Buta and said that one may bring a provisional guilt offering for any uncertain sin, not only those stated by the Rabbis? With regard to a provisional guilt offering, the verse states: ''And if anyone sins, and does any of the mitzvot of the Lord which may not be done, and he did not know, and he is guilty'' (Leviticus 5:17). This indicates that one brings a provisional guilt offering for any form of sin.

Rava said: What is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis, who say: One brings a provisional guilt offering only for the uncertain performance of a matter for whose intentional performance one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting performance one is liable to bring a sin offering? They derive this halakha by a verbal analogy between the word ''mitzvot'' with regard to a provisional guilt offering and the word ''mitzvot'' from a sin offering of forbidden fat, i.e., a standard sin offering, where it is written: ''Any of the mitzvot of the Lord'' (Leviticus 4:27).

The Gemara explains the verbal analogy: Just as there, it is referring to a sin for whose intentional performance one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting performance one is liable to bring a sin offering, so too here, a provisional guilt offering is brought for a matter for whose intentional performance one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting performance one is liable to bring a sin offering.

§ The Sages taught in a baraita: Five guilt offerings atone, whereas a provisional guilt offering does not atone with a complete atonement. The Gemara asks: What is the tanna of this baraita saying? Rav Yosef said that this is what the baraita is saying: Five guilt offerings atone with a complete atonement to the extent that no further atonement is necessary, but a provisional guilt offering does not atone with a complete atonement, since if it later became known to him that he sinned, he must bring a sin offering to achieve atonement.

And this statement of the baraita is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, i.e., the opinion of those who spoke to Bava ben Buta, as they say: A provisional guilt offering may come for an uncertain eating of a non-kosher animal carcass. In the case of one who brought a provisional guilt offering for a sin such as the uncertain eating of an animal carcass and later found out that he sinned, he does not bring a sin offering and does not require any additional atonement.

Ravina said that this is what the baraita is teaching: With regard to five guilt offerings, nothing else achieves the atonement that they achieve, as one brings these offerings when it becomes known to him that he sinned. By contrast, with regard to a provisional guilt offering, another item achieves the atonement that it achieves, as one does not bring this offering when his uncertain sin becomes known to him. As we learned in the mishna: Those liable to bring sin offerings and definite guilt offerings for whom Yom Kippur has passed are liable to bring them after Yom Kippur, whereas those liable to bring provisional guilt offerings are exempt from bringing them after Yom Kippur.

§ With regard to those liable to bring sin offerings and definite guilt offerings, the mishna teaches: Those liable to bring sin offerings and definite guilt offerings for whom Yom Kippur has passed are liable to bring them after Yom Kippur. By contrast, those liable to bring provisional guilt offerings are exempt from bringing them after Yom Kippur. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived, that Yom Kippur does not atone for those liable to bring sin offerings and definite guilt offerings?

When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael, he said that Rabbi Ami says that Rabbi Ḥanina says that the verse states with regard to Yom Kippur: ''And he shall make atonement for the holy place, from the impurity of the children of Israel, and from their transgressions, for all their sins'' (Leviticus 16:16). This indicates that sins, i.e., violations committed unwittingly, are similar to transgressions, violations committed intentionally: Just as Yom Kippur atones for transgressions, which are not subject to atonement through an offering, as personal sin offerings are brought only for unwitting sins, so too with regard to sins, Yom Kippur atones only for sins that are not subject to atonement through an offering, but Yom Kippur does not atone for sins that are subject to atonement through an offering.

Abaye said to Rav Dimi: But how can one derive this matter from the verse? When that verse is written, it is written with regard to the goat whose blood presentation is performed inside the Sanctuary on Yom Kippur,which does not atone for a known violation of a mitzva, but only for a violation that is unknown. Perhaps only that offering does not atone for sins that are subject to atonement through an offering, but with regard to the scapegoat that is dispatched to Azazel, which atones for a known violation of a mitzva, I could say to you that it atones even for those sins that are subject to atonement through an offering.

Rather, Abaye said that the matter is derived from here, a verse that deals with the scapegoat: ''And he shall confess over it all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions, for all their sins'' (Leviticus 16:21). This indicates that sins are similar to transgressions: Just as the scapegoat atones for transgressions, which are not subject to atonement through an offering, so too with regard to sins, the scapegoat atones only for sins that are not subject to atonement through an offering, but it does not atone for sins that are subject to atonement through an offering. And the verse limited the scope of atonement specifically with regard to the scapegoat, in order to say that despite the scapegoat’s greater capacity to achieve atonement, it does not atone for sins that are subject to atonement through an offering.

Rav Dimi said to Abaye: From where is it known that those transgressions mentioned in that verse are not subject to atonement through an offering? Perhaps those transgressions are subject to atonement through an offering, as we learned in a mishna (9a): There are four who bring an offering for an intentional transgression as they do for an unwitting sin: One who engages in intercourse with an espoused maidservant, a nazirite who became ritually impure, one who falsely takes the oath of testimony that he does not know testimony on behalf of another, and one who falsely takes the oath on a deposit that the item belonging to another is not in his possession. The Gemara does not provide Abaye’s answer to this question at this point.

It was also stated with regard to this matter that when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael he related a statement that Rabbi Yosei says that Reish Lakish says: The verse states: ''And he shall confess over it all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions, for all their sins'' (Leviticus 16:21). This indicates that sins are similar to transgressions: Just as the scapegoat atones for transgressions, which are not subject to atonement through an offering, so too with regard to sins, the scapegoat atones only for sins that are not subject to atonement through an offering, but it does not atone for sins that are subject to atonement through an offering.

Abaye said: I also said that this halakha was derived from that verse, and Rav Dimi raised the following difficulty before me: From where is it known that those transgressions mentioned in the verse are not subject to atonement through an offering? Perhaps those transgressions are subject to atonement through an offering, as we learned in a mishna that there are four who bring an offering for an intentional transgression as they do for an unwitting sin. Ravin said to Abaye: The majority of transgressions are not subject to atonement through an offering. Abaye said to him: Is the term majority written in that verse?

Rather, Abaye said that an answer to Rav Dimi’s question can be inferred from the beginning of the verse: ''And he shall confess over it all the iniquities of the children of Israel'' (Leviticus 16:21), and it is taught in a baraita: The term ''iniquities'' is referring to those sins that were performed intentionally. And similarly, the verse states: ''Because he despised the word of the Lord, and has broken His commandment; that soul shall utterly be cut off, his iniquity shall be upon him'' (Numbers 15:31).

Abaye continues: If so, when it states: ''And all their transgressions, for all their sins,'' why do I need the verse to mention ''all their transgressions,'' which is also referring to sins that were intentionally performed? It is written to juxtapose sins to transgressions: Just as the scapegoat atones for transgressions, the majority of which are not subject to atonement through an offering, so too with regard to sins, it atones only for sins that are not subject to atonement through an offering, but it does not atone for sins that are subject to atonement through an offering.

§ The mishna teaches: Those liable to bring provisional guilt offerings are exempt from bringing them after Yom Kippur. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived? Rabbi Elazar said: With regard to Yom Kippur the verse states: ''For on this day shall atonement be made for you, to cleanse you; from all your sins you shall be pure before the Lord'' (Leviticus 16:30). This indicates that Yom Kippur atones for a sin of which only the Omnipresent is aware, i.e., an uncertain sin that renders one liable to bring a provisional guilt offering.

Rav Taḥlifa, father of Rav Huna bar Taḥlifa, said in the name of Rava: With regard to the first clause in the mishna as well: Those liable to bring sin offerings and definite guilt offerings for whom Yom Kippur has passed are liable to bring them after Yom Kippur, one cannot bring a convincing proof