The Gemara notes: And yet in the final case in the baraita, it does not teach that in a situation where he is uncertain whether he ate from it he brings a provisional guilt offering. Whose opinion is this? If we say it is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, let him also teach in the last clause: For a case where he is uncertain whether he ate from them he brings a provisional guilt offering, as we learned in the mishna (22b) that Rabbi Akiva deems one liable to bring a provisional guilt offering for uncertainty about misuse of consecrated property.

Rather, isn’t the baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva and holds that one is not liable to bring a provisional guilt offering for uncertainty about misuse of consecrated property? And it teaches that one who eats notar from one offering cooked in five pots during five separate lapses of awareness brings five sin offerings, which indicates that if he did so during a single lapse of awareness he would be liable to bring only one sin offering, in accordance with the opinion stated by Rabbi Akiva in the mishna. And one can conclude from here that Rabbi Yehoshua accepted the refutation from Rabbi Akiva.

The Gemara responds: But on the contrary, one can infer otherwise from the latter clause of the baraita, which teaches: If he ate from five separate offerings, even during one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every one. One can conclude from this statement that Rabbi Yehoshua did not accept the refutation from Rabbi Akiva.

Rather, what is there to say about this baraita? It must be said that it is a dispute between tanna’im, that there is a tanna who maintains that Rabbi Yehoshua accepted Rabbi Akiva’s refutation, and there is a tanna who maintains that Rabbi Yehoshua did not accept it.

But once the baraita is interpreted in accordance with two different tanna’im, you may even say that the earlier clause of the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva and not Rabbi Yehoshua. And this tanna of the baraita holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva in one matter and disagrees with his opinion in one matter: He holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva with regard to a lapse of awareness, that if one eats from five offerings during a single lapse of awareness he is liable to bring only one sin offering. But he disagrees with his opinion with regard to misuse of consecrated property, as he does not deem one liable to bring a provisional guilt offering for uncertainty about whether he misused consecrated property.

§ The mishna teaches that if one eats five pieces from a single offering, each of which was cooked in a separate pot, he is liable to bring five guilt offerings for misuse of consecrated property. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances which require five guilt offerings for misuse of consecrated property? Shmuel says: The five pieces must be from separate parts of the offering, like that which we learned in a mishna (Me’ila 15b) with regard to a different topic: Five items from a burnt offering combine to form an olive-bulk that renders one liable for sacrificing an offering outside the Temple: The meat, and the forbidden fat, and the wine from the libations of the burnt offering, and the fine flour from the meal offering brought with the libations, and the oil for mixing with the meal offering.

Ḥizkiyya says: The obligation to bring five guilt offerings applies in a case where he ate from five different limbs of one offering. Reish Lakish says: You may even say that he ate from one limb, and you find this in a case where he ate from the shoulder of an offering, which has several different sections. Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa says: It applies in a case where he ate pieces of meat prepared as five different types of cooked dishes. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It applies in a case where he ate five pieces of meat that had five different flavors, as they were prepared with different types of seasonings.

MISHNA: Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer with regard to one who performs multiple prohibited labors on several Shabbatot, and all those labors were subsumed as subcategories of one primary category of prohibited labor, and he performed them during one lapse of awareness. What is the halakha? Is he liable to bring one sin offering for unwitting performance of all these labors or is he liable to bring a sin offering for violation of each and every one of the labors?

Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Akiva: He is liable to bring a sin offering for violation of each and every one of the labors, and this is derived from an a fortiori inference: Just as in the case of a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are not multiple actions that result in transgression and that result in multiple sin offerings, but rather only the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with her, and nevertheless one is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every one of his acts of unwitting intercourse; in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there are multiple primary categories and subcategories of labor that result in transgression and that result in multiple death penalties or sin offerings, is it not right that he will be liable to bring a sin offering for performance of each and every one of the prohibited labors?

Rabbi Akiva continues: I said to Rabbi Eliezer that the inference is not valid: If you said one is liable to bring multiple sin offerings in the case of a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are two prohibitions, as the man is prohibited from engaging in intercourse with the menstruating woman and the menstruating woman is prohibited from engaging in intercourse with him, would you say the same in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there is only one prohibition?

Rabbi Eliezer said to me: The halakha of one who engages in intercourse with minor menstruating girls will prove this refutation is not valid, as in that case there is only one prohibition, because the minor is exempt from the mitzvot, and nevertheless the man is liable to bring a separate sin offering for intercourse for each and every one of the acts of intercourse.

Rabbi Akiva said: I said to Rabbi Eliezer that the cases of Shabbat and minor menstruating girls are not comparable. If you said in the case of minor girls that although it is not prohibited for them at present it is prohibited for them after the passage of time, when they reach majority, would you say the same in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there are neither two prohibitions at present, nor will there be after the passage of time?

Rabbi Eliezer said to me: The halakha of one who copulates with an animal will prove this refutation is not valid, as there are never two prohibitions in that case, and nevertheless the person is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every act. Rabbi Akiva said: I said to Rabbi Eliezer that no proof can be cited from the case of an animal, as in my opinion the case of the animal is like that of Shabbat; there is uncertainty with regard to both cases.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What precise dilemma did Rabbi Akiva raise before Rabbi Eliezer? If he raised a dilemma about whether different Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities or not, i.e., if performing one labor on several Shabbatot during one lapse of awareness is similar to engaging in intercourse with multiple menstruating women during one lapse of awareness, let him raise the dilemma as follows: If one performs one prohibited labor on each of several Shabbatot during a single lapse of awareness, what is the halakha?

Rather, perhaps he raised a dilemma about whether different subcategories of a single prohibited labor are comparable to different primary categories, which would mean one is liable separately for each, or not. But if so, let him ask raise the dilemma in the following manner: In the case of one who performs multiple prohibited labors, all subsumed as subcategories of one primary category of labor, on a single Shabbat, during a single lapse of awareness, what is the halakha? Why did Rabbi Akiva specify a case of one who performed multiple prohibited labors on multiple Shabbatot?

Rava said: They say in the school of Rav [bei Rav] that Rabbi Akiva raised two dilemmas before him: He raised a dilemma about whether Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities or whether they are not comparable to separate entities, and he also raised a dilemma about whether different subcategories of a single prohibited labor are comparable to different primary categories of labor, or whether they are not. Rabbi Eliezer answered that multiple Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities, and that one who performs different subcategories of a single category of prohibited labor is like one who performs multiple primary categories of labor.

The Gemara raises another question with regard to the mishna: And in connection to the performance of the same category of prohibited labor on each of several Shabbatot during a single lapse of awareness, what is the precise case about which Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma? If the individual was unwitting in that he was unaware that it was Shabbat but acted intentionally with regard to the prohibited labors, i.e., he knew that these labors are prohibited on Shabbat, perhaps it is obvious to Rabbi Akiva that the intervening days constitute an awareness of his sin, which serves to differentiate between the Shabbatot and render the individual liable to bring separate sin offerings for each Shabbat.

And if so, it is in reference to a case where the individual acts intentionally with regard to Shabbat, i.e., he knows that it is Shabbat, but he acts unwittingly in that he does not know that the prohibited labors he is performing are prohibited on Shabbat, that Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma. His dilemma is whether the Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities, which would mean that he is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each Shabbat, or whether they are not comparable to separate entities and therefore he is liable to bring only one sin offering.

Or perhaps in the case where he acts intentionally with regard to Shabbat and unwittingly with regard to prohibited labors, it is obvious to Rabbi Akiva that the Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities and he is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each Shabbat. And it is in reference to a case where he acts unwittingly in that he does not know it is Shabbat, but he acts intentionally in that he knows that the labors he is performing are prohibited on Shabbat, that Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma. His dilemma is whether the intervening days between the Shabbatot are considered awareness of his sin, which would serve to differentiate between one sin and the next, or not.

Rabba said: