Concerning ritual impurity, what does Rabbi Yehuda say? Do we say that Rabbi Yehuda says that the second offspring is considered as though it does not exist only with regard to the matter of an offering? In other words, since the time in which it was possible to sacrifice an offering for the second fetus had not yet emerged, since that is so, the second offspring is considered as though it does not exist. But concerning the matter of ritual impurity and purity, we say that he holds that it is considered as something that does exist, and accordingly, the days of impurity brought on by the second birth interrupt the days of purity following the first birth. The woman must therefore observe the days of impurity for the second birth, and afterward she completes the days of purity for the first birth, and then counts the days of purity brought on by the second fetus.

Or perhaps, according to Rabbi Yehuda, the second offspring is considered as though it exists only where there is a stringency that results from that definition. But here, if the woman would complete the days of purity of the first birth after the days of impurity of the second, this is a leniency, as she is deemed pure even if she sees blood during these days, and therefore, perhaps Rabbi Yehuda does not hold that the offspring is considered existent where this results in a leniency.

Rav Huna from Sura said: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: In the case of a woman after childbirth, one slaughters the Paschal offering and sprinkles its blood on her account on the fourteenth of Nisan, if this occurs on the fortieth day after giving birth to a male or on the eightieth day after giving birth to a female. Although she is still impure at the time of the sacrifice, she will be able to partake of the Paschal offering on the night of the fifteenth of Nisan.

The Sages challenged this baraita: Is that so? But she is still impure on the night of the fifteenth of Nisan, and she may not partake of sacrificial meat until she brings her offering on the forty-first day for a male or the eighty-first day for a female. And Rav Ḥisda said in response: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that the second offspring is deemed as though it does not exist. The baraita is dealing with a case where the woman gave birth to two male offspring on two consecutive days, and the fourteenth of Nisan occurred on the fortieth day after the birth of the second offspring, which is the forty-first day following the birth of the first.

And if you say that concerning impurity, Rabbi Yehuda holds that the second offspring is considered as though it is extant, which means that the days of purity following the first birth are delayed by the second birth and the mother does not become pure until the second term is complete, how may one slaughter the Paschal offering on her account on the fortieth day? After all, in the evening of the fifteenth she also may not eat the Paschal offering, because only forty days will have passed from the time of the second birth, and she would still be impure. Rather, must one not conclude from it that concerning ritual purity and impurity, Rabbi Yehuda holds that the second offspring is considered as though it does not exist?

The Gemara rejects this proof: Actually, I could say to you: Even concerning impurity and purity, Rabbi Yehuda holds that the second offspring is considered as something that does exist; and when that baraita is taught, it is dealing with a case of a woman who gave birth to one child, and it is referring to a case of a Paschal offering that is brought in impurity. When the majority of a community is impure, the Paschal offering is brought even in impurity.

The Gemara objects: And in that case, does she partake of it, as the baraita suggests? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Pesaḥim 95b): With regard to a Paschal offering brought in impurity, men who experience a gonorrhea-like discharge [zavim], women who experience a discharge of uterine blood after their menstrual periods [zavot], menstruating women, and women after childbirth may not partake of it?

The Gemara explains: In that case, they do not partake of it because they did not immerse themselves in a ritual bath. But when that mishna is taught, that one slaughters the Paschal offering and sprinkles its blood on her account, the reason is that she had already immersed herself on the eighth day after giving birth. The Gemara objects: If that is so, then it is from the eighth day following his birth that she is fit to eat a Paschal offering brought in impurity, and there is no reason for the baraita to specify that the offering is slaughtered on the fortieth day.

The Gemara explains: Actually, she is not fit from the eighth day, because the tanna maintains that a zav who immersed that day and is waiting for nightfall for the purification process to be completed is considered to have the status of a zav and may not partake of a Paschal offering brought in ritual impurity. Similarly, a woman who immerses after giving birth is considered like one who immersed that day, and therefore she cannot partake of sacrificial meat until the end of the forty-day period.

The Gemara objects: If that is so, then on the fortieth day she is also not fit to eat the Paschal offering. The Gemara explains: This is not so; on the fortieth day she is fit to partake of the Paschal offering after nightfall, because the tanna holds that a zav who has immersed himself and waited for nightfall but is lacking atonement, i.e., he has not yet brought an atonement offering to complete the purification process, is not considered to have the status of a zav. Therefore, after completing the purification period, the woman may partake of the offering, despite the fact that she has not yet brought her atonement offering.

The Gemara asks: But according to Rava, who says that a zav who is lacking atonement is considered to have the status of a zav, how does he resolve the problem in this baraita? Rav Ashi said that Rava resolves it as follows: The baraita is not referring to the fortieth day after the birth of a male, but to a miscarriage that occurred on the fortieth day after the conception of a male, or the eightieth day after the conception of a female. And it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who says that it takes forty-one days for a male fetus to be formed, and eighty-one days for a female fetus to be formed. Since the miscarriage occurred before the forty-first or eighty-first day, it does not render the woman impure with the impurity of childbirth, and therefore she may partake of the Paschal offering.

The Gemara objects: But ultimately, one should conclude that she is impure because she has the status of a menstruating woman. The Gemara explains: The mishna was stated with regard to the case of a dry birth, in which no blood was expelled, and therefore no impurity imparted. The Gemara asks: If that is so, then what is the purpose of stating it? The ruling in such a case is obvious. The Gemara answers: It was necessary to state it, lest you say that it is impossible for the womb to open without blood being expelled. The tanna therefore teaches us that it is possible for the womb to open without blood being expelled. Accordingly, Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion with regard to the impurity of a second birth cannot be deduced from this mishna.

Rabbi Shemaya said: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: The verse states with regard to a woman who gave birth to a female: ''And she shall continue in the blood of purification sixty days and six days'' (Leviticus 12:5). One might have thought that she counts the days whether they are continuous or dispersed. Therefore, the verse states: ''Sixty days and six days,'' to teach that just as a day is a continuous time period, so too all sixty days are continuous. And whose opinion is this? If we say it is the opinion of the Rabbis, that cannot be correct, as are the Rabbis of the opinion that it is possible for a woman who gave birth to count dispersed days? This is not the case, as the Rabbis count the days of purification from the second birth.

Rather, is it not the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? And from the fact that he prescribes for her sixty continuous days to be counted together, conclude from it that Rabbi Yehuda maintains that the second offspring is considered extant only where a stringency results, but where a leniency results, in that she continues counting the days of purity of the first birth after completing the days of impurity for the second birth, he does not maintain that the second offspring is considered as though it exists.

The Gemara rejects this proof: No, actually, the baraita is stated in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. And what are we dealing with here? We are dealing with a woman who gives birth to a male within the eighty-day period following the birth of a female, so that the forty-day period for the male is entirely subsumed within the purification period for the female. In such a case, even the Rabbis would maintain that the second birth does not interrupt the term following the first. She would observe the seven days of impurity for the male, and then complete the days of purity for the female. Consequently, the verse teaches that the sixty-six days of purity following the first birth are observed continuously, and there is no need to observe additional days due to the intervening days of impurity.

The Gemara objects: But ultimately, this scenario is impossible; the reason is that the days of the first birth are completed while the days of the latter birth are not completed, as the Rabbis count the days following the second birth, and therefore the term relating to the first birth is abandoned. The Gemara offers a different explanation of the baraita: Rather, you find a case of counting dispersed days according to the Rabbis in a case where a woman gives birth to twins, first a female and then a male, and for example, she gives birth to the latter offspring, the male, on the twentieth day of the days of purity for the female, as she is required to observe for him seven days of impurity for birth.

The Gemara explains: And this is what the baraita is saying: One might have thought that where she gave birth to twins, a female initially and a male afterward, that the impurity of the second birth interrupts the term following the first birth in the middle, and she counts sixty-six dispersed days. Therefore, the verse states: ''Sixty days and six days,'' to teach that just as a day is an entirely continuous time period, so too all sixty days are to be continuous. Since the baraita could be in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, no proof can be inferred with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

Abaye said: Come and hear a proof from a baraita which discusses a woman who gave birth to a male. The verse states: ''And she shall continue in the blood of purification three days and thirty days'' (Leviticus 12:4). One might have thought that she counts the days whether they are continuous or dispersed. Therefore, the verse states: ''Three days and thirty days,'' to teach that just as a day is an entirely continuous time period, so too all thirty days are to be continuous. And whose opinion is this? If we say it is the Rabbis, that cannot be correct, as are the Rabbis of the opinion that