Since we find that the verse equates a minor, i.e., one on the brink of adulthood, to an adult with regard to an intentional violation of an oath and with regard to a vow of prohibition, where one renders an item prohibited to himself through a vow, and with regard to the prohibition of he shall not profane his word, one might have thought that this minor, like an adult, should also be liable to bring an offering for misuse of his consecrated property, e.g., if he ate an item that he consecrated.

Therefore, the verse states with regard to vows: ''This is the matter which the Lord has commanded. When a man vows a vow to the Lord, or takes an oath'' (Numbers 30:2–3). The emphasis of ''this'' indicates that it is only with regard to this matter, i.e., prohibitions resulting from vows, that a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is considered an adult, but he is not rendered liable to bring an offering for his misuse.

The Gemara analyzes the baraita. In any event, the baraita teaches that a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is considered an adult with regard to a vow of prohibition and with regard to the prohibition of he shall not profane his word, which indicates that he is liable for violating this prohibition. This supports the opinion of Rav Huna that a minor is flogged for eating food he consecrated. The Gemara refutes this proof: There is room to say that the word: And, in the phrase: With regard to a vow of prohibition and with regard to the prohibition of he shall not profane his word, should be omitted, and the baraita is comparing a minor to an adult with regard to the prohibition of he shall not profane his word, but it does not indicate that he is liable to receive lashes for violating this prohibition.

The Gemara asks: Can the baraita actually mean that a minor is compared to an adult with regard to the prohibition of he shall not profane his word, but he is not flogged? Whichever way you look at it, this is problematic: If a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is considered an adult by Torah law, he should be flogged too, for his violation. And if a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is not considered an adult by Torah law, there is no prohibition violated here either. The Gemara answers that according to the baraita the prohibition does not apply to the minor himself, but to those who are warned to keep him away from the prohibited item.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, one can conclude from the baraita that if a minor eats meat from unslaughtered animal carcasses or violates other prohibitions, the court is commanded to prevent him from doing so. This is problematic, as elsewhere it is stated that this matter is subject to dispute (see Yevamot 114a). The Gemara explains: Here we are dealing with a case where the minor consecrated the food item and others ate it. They are liable to receive lashes for their consumption, but if he ate it he is not liable.

The Gemara raises another difficulty: This works out well according to the one who said that if a minor consecrated a food item and others ate it, they are flogged. But according to the one who said that in such a case they are not flogged, what can be said? As it was stated that amora’im disagreed with regard to this issue: If a minor consecrated a food item and others ate it, Rav Kahana says that they are not flogged; Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both say that they are flogged.

The Gemara therefore reverts to the interpretation that the baraita is referring to the prohibition of he shall not profane his word, not the punishment for violation of the vow. And the reason lashes are not administered is that the prohibition is by rabbinic law. And as for the verse mentioned in the baraita, when it states that the verse equates a minor to an adult, which indicates that it is dealing with Torah law, this verse is a mere support for a rabbinic law.

§ The Gemara discusses the matter itself, i.e., the dispute cited above. If a minor consecrated a food item and others ate it, Rav Kahana says that they are not flogged; Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both say that they are flogged. With regard to what principle do these Sages disagree? One Sage, i.e., Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish, holds that a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is considered an adult by Torah law, which is why others are liable for eating an item he consecrated; and one Sage, Rav Kahana, holds that a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is considered an adult by rabbinic law.

Rav Yirmeya raises an objection from a baraita: In the case of a minor girl who is an orphan from her father and her mother or brothers accepted betrothal on her behalf, who vowed, her husband may nullify her vow, like any other husband, despite the fact that this marriage is valid merely by rabbinic law. Rav Yirmeya analyzes this baraita: Granted, if you say that a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is considered an adult by rabbinic law, one can explain that a husband whose marriage is by rabbinic law comes and negates a vow that also applies by rabbinic law. But if you say that a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is considered an adult by Torah law, can a husband whose marriage is by rabbinic law come and negate a vow that applies by Torah law?

Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: Her husband may nullify her vows, whichever way you look at it: If the validity of the vows of such a minor applies by rabbinic law, the husband may nullify her vows, as the validity of their marriage is likewise by rabbinic law. And if the validity of a vow by a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is by Torah law, which means she would be violating a Torah prohibition, this is the same as the case of a minor who may eat meat from unslaughtered animal carcasses or violate other prohibitions, and the court or any other adult, including her husband in this case, is not commanded to prevent him from doing so,and it does not matter if his nullification was not effective.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But there is still concern for a violation, as when she grows and becomes an adult she will eat the food that she rendered forbidden to herself, relying on the initial nullification of her vow by her husband, which was not valid. At that stage she is an adult, whom the court is certainly commanded to prevent from violating prohibitions.

Rabba bar Livai said that this is not a concern, as her husband nullifies her vows each and every moment, and therefore when she reaches majority he will nullify her vow in a manner that is valid by Torah law. And this is the halakha, that the nullification takes effect by Torah law, only in a case where her husband engaged in intercourse with her after she became an adult, thereby rendering their marriage valid by Torah law.

The Gemara raises another difficulty: But there is a principle that a husband cannot nullify vows of his wife that preceded their marriage; and as she is considered his wife by Torah law only when she becomes an adult, her vow when she was a minor preceded their marriage. The Gemara answers that he can still nullify her vow, in accordance with the statement of Rav Pineḥas in the name of Rava, as Rav Pineḥas said in the name of Rava: Any woman who takes a vow, it is from the outset contingent on her husband’s consent that she takes the vow. Since the minor was married by rabbinic law, she vowed on the condition that her husband should agree to her vow, and therefore the nullification is valid by Torah law.

§ The Gemara continues to discuss the validity of the vows of a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood. Abaye said: Come and hear a mishna (Terumot 1:3): With regard to a minor who has not grown two hairs, Rabbi Yehuda says: His teruma is not valid teruma. Rabbi Yosei says: Until he has reached the age of vows, i.e., when he does not yet have the status of a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood, his teruma is not valid teruma, but once he has reached the age of vows, his teruma is teruma.

The Sages assumed that Rabbi Yosei holds that teruma in the present applies by Torah law. They therefore objected: Granted, if you say that a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is an adult by Torah law, one can understand that one who is a man by Torah law with regard to vows can come and prepare untithed produce [tivla] for consumption by tithing it, which also applies by Torah law. But if you say that a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is an adult by rabbinic law, can one who is a man by rabbinic law come and prepare untithed produce, which is prohibited by Torah law? The Gemara refutes this proof: No, perhaps Rabbi Yosei holds that teruma in the present applies by rabbinic law, and this is why he rules that a minor on the brink of adulthood can set aside teruma.

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yosei hold that teruma in the present applies by rabbinic law? But isn’t it taught in a baraita in the anthology called Seder Olam: The verse that states with regard to the Jewish people’s return to Eretz Yisrael following their exile: ''And the Lord your God will bring you into the land that your fathers possessed, and you shall possess it'' (Deuteronomy 30:5).

These two expressions of possession indicate that the Jewish people had a first possession of Eretz Yisrael in the days of Joshua, when Eretz Yisrael was first sanctified with regard to the obligation of its mitzvot, and they had a second possession at the time of Ezra and the return of the Babylonian exile. In other words, the sanctity of the land lapsed when the First Temple was destroyed and the Jews were exiled to Babylonia, and therefore a second sanctification was necessary when they returned to their land. But they will not have a third possession. That is, it will never be necessary to sanctify the land a third time, as the second sanctification was permanent.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Who is the tanna that taught Seder Olam? Rabbi Yosei. Since Rabbi Yosei maintains that the second sanctification of Eretz Yisrael did not lapse even after the destruction of the Second Temple, he must also maintain that teruma in the present applies by Torah law.

The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yosei taught Seder Olam but he does not maintain in accordance with its ruling here. The Gemara adds: So too, it is reasonable that this is so, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to non-sacred dough that became mixed with teruma dough, or which was leavened with leaven of teruma,