You should have brought water in a bucket.

Rav Pappa said: With regard to these first two mishnayot, you find that they are correct, concerning both tenancy, where the tenant farmer gives a certain amount of produce to the owner and keeps the rest, as well as the case of a contractor, who gives a set proportion, e.g., one-quarter or one-third, of the yield to the owner, and keeps the rest. From this point forward, i.e., from the third mishna of the chapter until its end, that which is relevant to the case of a contractor is not applicable to tenancy, and that which is relevant to tenancy is not applicable to the case of a contractor.

§ The mishna teaches: If the cultivator said to the landowner explicitly: Lease me this irrigated field, or he said: Lease me this field with trees, and the spring dried up or the trees were cut down, he may subtract from the produce he owes as part of his tenancy. The Gemara asks: But why is this so? Let the owner say to him: I told you only the name, i.e., the type, of the field, but this does not mean it would actually be irrigated during the time you are cultivating it. Isn’t it taught in a baraita: In the case of one who says to another: I am selling you a beit kor field of dirt, although the field contains only a half-kor, once the buyer purchases the dirt it has come to him, i.e., he may not retract from the transaction, as the seller sold him the dirt only by the name, and he did not mean that its size was precisely a beit kor. The baraita adds: And this is the halakha only where that field is called by people a beit kor.

The baraita continues: Similarly, if he said: I am selling you a vineyard, then although it does not have vines, once he purchases the land it has come to him, as the seller sold him the field only by the name; and this is the halakha only where it is called a vineyard. Likewise, if he said: I am selling you an orchard, then even though it does not have pomegranates, once he purchases the land it has come to him, as he sold him only by the name; and again this is the case only where it is called an orchard. Apparently, the seller can say to him: I told you only the name. So too here, let the seller say to him: I told you only the name.

Shmuel said: It is not difficult; this baraita is comparable to a case where the owner of the land said to the tenant farmer what he was leasing him, while in that mishna the tenant farmer said to the owner of the land what he was leasing from him. The reason for the difference is that if the owner of the land said the terms to the tenant farmer, then he can claim that he told him only the name, and the tenant farmer cannot object. But if the tenant farmer said the terms to the owner of the land, then he was clearly particular to receive a field that would be irrigated when he cultivated it.

Ravina said: Both this baraita and that mishna are referring to a case where the owner of the land told the tenant farmer what he was leasing him, as implied by the mishna, but since the owner said: This irrigated field, by inference we are dealing with one who is standing inside it. Why, then, does the owner need to state the fact that it is an irrigated field? It is obvious simply from looking at it that it is irrigated. Rather, the owner must have said to him by way of emphasis that he is providing an irrigated field as it currently stands.

MISHNA: With regard to one who receives a field from another as a contractor and then lets it lie fallow and does not work the land at all, the court appraises it by evaluating how much it was able to produce if cultivated, and he gives his share of this amount to the owner. The reason is that this is what a cultivator writes to the owner in a standard contract: If I let the field lie fallow and do not cultivate it, I will pay with best-quality produce.

GEMARA: Rabbi Meir would expound common language used in legal documents written by ordinary Jews to deduce halakhic conclusions. Although these formulations were not prescribed by the Sages, one can nevertheless infer halakhot from them if they are used in legal documents. As it is taught in a baraita that presents a similar case to the mishna: Rabbi Meir says he is liable to pay, as the document states: If I let the field lie fallow and do not cultivate it, I will pay with best-quality produce.

Likewise, Rabbi Yehuda would also expound common language, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: In a case where a woman who has given birth is commanded to bring the offering of a childbearing woman and her husband is sufficiently wealthy, a person brings the offering of the rich on behalf of his wife. This is so even if his wife does not possess money of her own and perhaps should have been considered poor. Similarly, he may bring every offering that she is obligated to bring, such as a sin offering or guilt offering. He pays for all these offerings because this is what he writes to her in her marriage contract: I accept upon myself to repay you for all obligations that you have, even those from beforehand. Consequently, he must fund all of her offerings.

Similarly, Hillel the Elder would expound common language as well, as it is taught in a baraita: The inhabitants of Alexandria would betroth their wives a significant amount of time before the wedding, as was customary in those days, and at the time of their entry to the wedding canopy, others would come and snatch the women from their husbands. The Sages consequently sought to establish the children of these women as mamzerim. This is because with regard to sexual intercourse with other men, a betrothed woman has the status of a married woman. Consequently, if she is taken by another man, her children fathered by that man are mamzerim, just like children of a married woman who were fathered by a man other than her husband.

Hillel the Elder said to the children who came before him for a ruling on their status: Bring me your mother’s marriage contract for examination. They brought him their mother’s marriage contract, and he found that the following formulation was written in it: When you will enter the wedding canopy, be for me a wife. This shows that the marriage would not take effect at the time of her betrothal, but only after she would enter the wedding canopy. Consequently, the marriage did not occur at all, as she never entered the wedding canopy, and therefore these women did not cause their children to be mamzerim by engaging in intercourse with the other man.

The Gemara adds: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa would also expound common language. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: One who lends money to another may not take more collateral from him than the value of his debt, as this is what the debtor writes to the creditor if the creditor temporarily returns a deposit for the debtor’s use: The payment to which you have a right, which it is upon me to pay, corresponds to the entire value of this item, indicating that the item cannot be greater in value than the debt itself.

The Gemara infers: The reason the creditor acquires the collateral is that he wrote this to him. But if the creditor did not write this to the debtor, would the creditor not acquire the collateral? But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say: If a creditor took collateral from the debtor and returned the collateral to him and then the debtor died, the creditor removes the collateral from the debtor’s children. The reason for this is that although movable property of orphans is not acquired by their father’s creditor, the collateral is considered to belong to the creditor, and he can collect the debt from it.