Rav Huna said to him: You are out [hotza’a]. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin was embarrassed, as he thought Rav Huna told him he was out, i.e., wrong, due to the halakha he stated. Sensing Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin’s embarrassment, Rav Huna said to him: This is what I said: You are a Hutzla’a, as Rav Asi, from the town of Huzal, stands in accordance with your opinion.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that it is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im. The baraita (Tosefta, Ma’aser Sheni 3:9) taught: One who steals another’s untithed produce pays him the full value of the other’s untithed produce; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: He pays only the value of the non-sacred produce that it contains. What, is it not the case that they disagree about this issue: That one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, holds that the benefit of discretion has monetary value, so he must be compensated beyond the value of the non-sacred produce; and one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, holds that the benefit of discretion does not have monetary value, and only the non-sacred produce is of value to the owner.

The Gemara rejects this: No, everyone agrees that the benefit of discretion does not have monetary value, and here the case is with an Israelite who came into possession of untithed produce as an inheritance from the household of his mother’s father, who was a priest. And they disagree with regard to the question of whether or not gifts that have not been separated are considered as though they have been separated. One Sage, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, holds that they are considered as though they have been separated, which means that the grandson inherited the teruma itself from his grandfather, so the thief must repay him the value of the terumot and tithes as well. And one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, holds that such gifts are not considered as though they have been separated; and the produce is viewed as regular untithed produce, where the Israelite has only the benefit of discretion, which is of no monetary value.

And if you wish, say instead that everyone agrees that the gifts are considered as though they have been separated, and that the benefit of discretion does not have monetary value. The case is not concerning an Israelite who came into possession of untithed produce as an inheritance from the household of his mother’s father; rather, it is concerning regular untithed produce, and here they disagree with regard to a statement of Shmuel. As Shmuel says: By Torah law, even one grain given as teruma exempts the entire heap, since the Torah does not specify a minimum amount for teruma.

As one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, so the thief must pay the value of the untithed produce as well, since the owner can say that he would separate a single grain as teruma for the entire heap and the rest would remain non-sacred produce. And one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, is of the opinion that the ruling is not in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, which means that when the owner makes his claim he must subtract at least one-sixtieth of the total amount as teruma.

And if you wish, say instead that everyone is of the opinion that the ruling is not in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel; and here, this is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: Although the benefit of discretion does not have monetary value, and by right should not lead to reimbursement, the Sages penalized the thief. If he did not need to pay for the teruma contained in the produce, he would have been able to keep it, as no priest has the legal ability to demand that the teruma be given specifically to him.

And if you wish, say instead that everyone is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, and here, this is the reasoning of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda: The Sages penalized the owner, since he should not have left his untithed produce in that state, and should have separated teruma without delay.

We learned in the mishna: With regard to one who betroths a woman with terumot, or with tithes, or with the gifts given to priests, or with the water of purification, or with the ashes of the red heifer, in all of these cases she is betrothed, and this is so even if the man betrothing her is an Israelite. And the Gemara raises a contradiction to this from the following baraita (Tosefta, Bekhorot 3:5): With regard to one who accepts payment to judge, his judgments are nullified. Similarly, with regard to one who accepts payment to testify, his testimony is nullified. With regard to one who accepts payment to sprinkle the purification water on one who was impure from impurity imparted by a corpse, or to sanctify the purification water by placing the ashes of the red heifer in them, his water is considered cave water, which is generally foul, and his ashes are burnt ashes. Using these items to betroth a woman is analogous to being paid for them, so they should be considered as having no monetary value, and the betrothal should not take effect.

Abaye said: This is not difficult, since here, the mishna is referring to one who betroths a woman with the value of the payment for bringing and filling the vessel with the purification waters, for which one is permitted to accept payment. Performing this act for the woman is comparable to giving her an item of value, since she will not have to pay someone to bring and fill the vessel for her. There, the baraita dealing with one who accepts payment for sprinkling or sanctifying the water is referring to payment for the actual sprinkling and sanctifying.

The Gemara comments: According to this answer, the language of the mishna and the baraita is also precise, as it teaches here, in the mishna, that she is betrothed with the water of purification or with the ashes of purification, which indicates that the water and ashes have not yet been mixed together; and it teaches there, in the baraita: To sprinkle or to sanctify, indicating that he receives payment for the actual sprinkling and sanctification. The Gemara affirms: Learn from it that this is the correct explanation of the mishna and the baraita.

May return to you ''a man betroths''

MISHNA: With regard to one man who says to another: Go and betroth so-and-so to me, and the latter went and betrothed her to himself, she is betrothed to the second man. And similarly, with regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me after thirty days, and another man came and betrothed her within those thirty days, she is betrothed to the second man. This is a full-fledged betrothal, so that if she is an Israelite woman betrothed to a priest, she may partake of teruma.

If the first man said to the woman: You are hereby betrothed to me from now, and only after thirty days shall the betrothal take effect, and another man came and betrothed her within those thirty days, there is uncertainty whether she is betrothed or whether she is not betrothed to each of them. Consequently, if she was the daughter of a non-priest betrothed to a priest, or the daughter of a priest betrothed to an Israelite, she may not partake of teruma. Since her betrothal is uncertain, the daughter of a non-priest cannot be considered the wife of a priest, and similarly a priest’s daughter who is doubtfully married to an Israelite loses her right to partake of teruma as the daughter of a priest.

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that in the case of one man who says to another: Go and betroth so-and-so to me, and the latter went and betrothed her to himself, she is betrothed to the second man. A tanna taught concerning this issue: What he did is done; it is effective and the woman is betrothed to the second man, but he has treated him, i.e., the first man, in a deceitful manner, and it is prohibited to act in this fashion. The Gemara explains: And the tanna of our mishna, when he teaches the apparently superfluous term: Went, also indicates that he went and acted deceitfully.

§ The Gemara asks a question concerning the language of the mishna: What is different here that the mishna teaches: With regard to one man who says to another,