Rather, is it not that the first clause of the baraita is dealing with the contrast between Shabbat and idolatry, and the latter clause of the baraita is dealing with contrasting Shabbat and other mitzvot? And what are the circumstances of: Unwitting without intent, with regard to other mitzvot? It is in a case where one thought that it was permitted fat, and ate it, and later discovered that it was forbidden fat. This is one example of other mitzvot where one is liable. That is not the case with regard to Shabbat, where he is exempt, as one who intended to cut a detached plant and unwittingly severed a plant still attached to the ground is exempt. And according to Abaye, who holds that he is liable in that case, what are the circumstances of: Unwitting without intent, with regard to other mitzvot? It is in a case where one had something in his mouth and he thought it was spittle and swallowed it with no intention to eat it, and it turned out to be forbidden fat that he swallowed. This is one example of other mitzvot, where he is liable. That is not the case with regard to Shabbat, where the phrase: He is exempt, is referring to the case of one who intended to lift a plant detached from the ground and mistakenly severed a plant still attached to the ground. In that case, even Abaye agrees that he is exempt. However, one who intended to cut a detached plant and unwittingly severed a plant still attached to the ground is liable since he intended to perform a standard act of cutting. Therefore, no proof can be cited from this baraita.

A similar dispute between Abaye and Rava was stated. In the case of one who intended to throw an object two cubits in the public domain, for which he would not be liable by Torah law, and it turned out that he threw it four cubits, in violation of the prohibition by Torah law against carrying an object four cubits in the public domain, Rava said: He is exempt. Abaye said: He is liable. The Gemara elaborates: Rava said: He is exempt, as he does not intend to execute a throw of four cubits, and, consequently, does not intend to perform a prohibited act. Abaye said: He is liable, as he intends to execute a standard throw, and ultimately a throw that traveled a prohibited distance was executed. Another dispute between them was stated. In the case of one who thought that he was in the private domain and threw an object more than four cubits, and, ultimately, it was found to be the public domain, Rava said: He is exempt. And Abaye said: He is liable. The Gemara elaborates: Rava said: He is exempt, as he does not intend to execute a prohibited throw. In a private domain, he may throw an object as far as he chooses. And Abaye said: He is liable, as he intends to execute a standard throw.

The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to mention these three disputes, despite their similarities, because each one teaches a unique element. As, had the Gemara taught us only the first, the case of one who intended to lift a plant detached from the ground and mistakenly severed a plant still attached to the ground, we would have said that it was only in that case that Rava said he is exempt, as he does not intend to perform an act of prohibited severing. He had no intention to perform an action that entails desecration of Shabbat. However, the ruling in the case of one who intended to throw an object two cubits in the public domain and he threw it four cubits would be more stringent, as an object cannot be thrown four cubits without being thrown two cubits. A throw of two cubits is a component part of the four-cubit throw. Consequently, say that in that case Rava agrees with Abaye, as he performed an act that has a prohibited dimension to it. And, had the Gemara taught us the dispute in this case of throwing two cubits as well, we would have said that it is only in that case that Rava says that he is exempt, as he does not intend to execute a throw of four cubits. A throw of fewer than four cubits does not constitute a transgression. However, in the case of one who thought that he was in the private domain, and ultimately it was found to be the public domain where the individual intends to execute a throw of four cubits, which is a prohibited distance, say that Rava agrees with Abaye that he is liable. Therefore, it is necessary to mention all three cases in which they disagree.

We learned in a mishna: The primary categories of labor are forty-less-one, and we discussed it and asked: Why do I need this tally of forty-less-one? And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The tally was included to teach that if one performed all of the prohibited labors in the course of one lapse of awareness during which he was unaware of the prohibition involved, he is liable for each and every one. Granted, according to Abaye, who said that in a case like that one mentioned above, where one intended to throw an object two cubits and it traveled four cubits he is liable, you find that circumstance in a case where he was aware that the prohibition of Shabbat applies to certain labors, and he was aware that particular labors were prohibited, and was mistaken with regard to measures. He intended to perform an act involving less than the prohibited measure, and it turned out that the action he performed involved an amount equal to or greater than the prohibited measure. That is an unwitting act that renders him liable to bring a sin-offering, according to Abaye. However, according to Rava, who said that he is exempt in a case where one intended to throw an object two cubits and it traveled four cubits, in what circumstances do you find that he would be liable for each and every one? Is it in a case where, with regard to Shabbat, his actions were intentional, and, with regard to the prohibited labors, his actions were unwitting?

It works out well if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: Once he was unwitting with regard to the fact that the punishment for his transgression is karet, even though he was aware that his action was in violation of a Torah prohibition and performed the transgression intentionally, he is considered to have sinned unwittingly. If he holds in accordance with that opinion, you find a case where one could be liable for each and every prohibited labor when he was aware that performing labor on Shabbat involves violation of a Torah prohibition, but he was unaware that the punishment for violating that prohibition is karet. However, if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who said: It is not considered unwitting until he was unwitting with regard to both the prohibition and karet, the result is that he is completely unaware of all the prohibited labors of Shabbat. The question then arises: With regard to what aspect of Shabbat was he aware? If he was completely unaware of all the labors prohibited on Shabbat, in what sense were his actions intentional with regard to Shabbat? The Gemara answers: He was aware of the halakhot of the prohibition of Shabbat boundaries, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who holds that this prohibition is by Torah law.

MISHNA: This fundamental mishna enumerates those who perform the primary categories of labor prohibited on Shabbat, which number forty-less-one. They are grouped in accordance with their function: One who sows, and one who plows, and one who reaps, and one who gathers sheaves into a pile, and one who threshes, removing the kernel from the husk, and one who winnows threshed grain in the wind, and one who selects the inedible waste from the edible, and one who grinds, and one who sifts the flour in a sieve, and one who kneads dough, and one who bakes.

Additional primary categories of prohibited labor are the following: One who shears wool, and one who whitens it, and one who combs the fleece and straightens it, and one who dyes it, and one who spins the wool, and one who stretches the threads of the warp in the loom, and one who constructs two meshes, tying the threads of the warp to the base of the loom, and one who weaves two threads, and one who severs two threads for constructive purposes, and one who ties a knot, and one who unties a knot, and one who sews two stitches with a needle, as well as one who tears a fabric in order to sew two stitches.

One who traps a deer, or any living creature, and one who slaughters it, and one who flays it, and one who salts its hide, a step in the tanning process, and one who tans its hide, and one who smooths it, removing hairs and veins, and one who cuts it into measured parts.

One who writes two letters and one who erases in order to write two letters. One who builds a structure, and one who dismantles it, one who extinguishes a fire, and one who kindles a fire. One who strikes a blow with a hammer to complete the production process of a vessel (Rabbeinu Ḥananel), and one who carries out an object from domain to domain. All these are primary categories of labor, and they number forty-less-one.