Rather, doesn’t it refer to a case in which one had both intentions during one rite, and nevertheless it is valid? And since the latter clause speaks about one rite, the first clause, the current mishna, must also speak about one rite, and yet the offering is disqualified, because even the conclusion of one’s statement is significant, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.

The Gemara refutes this proof as it refuted the previous one: Are the two cases comparable? Perhaps this case is as it is and that case is as it is. There is no reason to equate the cases, as it is possible to say that the latter clause speaks about one rite, whereas the first clause, the current mishna, speaks either about one rite or about two rites. Therefore, there is no conclusive resolution to Rav Pappa’s question.

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: A Paschal lamb that one slaughtered on the rest of the days of the year other than the eve of Passover for its own purpose and for a different purpose, what is its status? The Gemara clarifies the two sides of the issue: Does the intent to offer the sacrifice for a different purpose come and nullify the intent to offer the sacrifice for its own purpose and thereby make it valid, or not? The law is that a Paschal lamb that was slaughtered for a different purpose at a time other than Passover eve attains the status of a peace-offering and is therefore valid. The question raised here is whether or not partial intent to slaughter the animal as a peace-offering rather than as a Paschal lamb suffices to validate the offering.

When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said: I raised this question in the presence of Rabbi Yirmeya and expressed my opinion: Since intent to offer the sacrifice for its own purpose validates it at its proper time, i.e., on the eve of Passover, and intent to offer the sacrifice for a different purpose validates it not at its proper time, i.e., the rest of the year, there is room to equate the two situations. Just as intent for its own purpose, which validates it at its proper time, does not nullify the intent to offer the sacrifice for a different purpose, i.e., if one intends to offer the sacrifice both for its own purpose and for a different purpose it is disqualified, so too, intent to offer the sacrifice for a different purpose, which validates it not at its proper time, does not nullify the intent to offer the sacrifice for its own purpose, and it is disqualified. It can be concluded from here that whenever one’s thoughts concerning an offering are a combination of validating and disqualifying intentions, the offering is disqualified.

And Rabbi Yirmeya said to me: No, this reasoning is not to be relied upon. If you say this rule concerning the intent to offer a Paschal lamb applies when it is sacrificed for a different purpose, it is because this disqualification applies to all offerings, as slaughtering an offering for a purpose other than its own disqualifies all offerings to one extent or another. Therefore, intent for the sacrifice’s own purpose does not nullify intent for a different purpose. But can you necessarily say the same thing about the intent to slaughter a Paschal lamb for its own purpose at other times of the year, a disqualification that does not apply to all offerings but to the Paschal lamb alone? Only the Paschal lamb is disqualified if it is slaughtered for its own purpose not at its proper time, and therefore intent for a different purpose can indeed nullify intent for its own purpose.

Rav Dimi’s argument having been refuted, the Gemara asks: What conclusion was reached about Rav Dimi’s question? Rava said: A Paschal lamb that one slaughtered on the rest of the days of the year with the intent that it be for its own purpose and for a different purpose is valid. The reason for this is as follows: In an otherwise undetermined situation, the animal stands to be offered for its own purpose, for one did not rescind its status as a Paschal lamb either verbally or by intent. But nevertheless, when he slaughters it for a different purpose, it is valid.

Apparently, then, the intent to offer the sacrifice for a different purpose comes and nullifies the presumed intent to offer it for its own purpose; the statement that one makes to slaughter the offering as a peace-offering rather than as a Paschal lamb has the power to remove it from its previous status as a Paschal lamb. Accordingly, we should also say that when the priest slaughters the animal both for its own purpose and for a different purpose, the intent to offer it for a different purpose carries more weight and comes and nullifies the stated intent to offer it for its own purpose.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said to Rava: Perhaps a case where one explicitly said that he was slaughtering the offering for its own purpose and for a different purpose is different from a case where he did not say this. The proof of this is that if one slaughtered the Paschal lamb for those who can eat it and those who cannot eat it, it is valid, but wherever he slaughters it only for the sake of those who cannot eat it, it is disqualified. Now, why should this be? Surely in an otherwise undetermined situation, the animal stands to be offered for those who can eat it. This indicates that presumed intention cannot be equated with intention that is explicitly verbalized. Rather, a case where one explicitly said that he is slaughtering the animal for those who can eat it and those who cannot eat it is different from a case where he did not say this. So too, a case where he explicitly said that he is slaughtering the offering for its own purpose and for a different purpose is different from a case where he did not say this.

Rava said to him: Are the two cases comparable? Granted, there, with regard to the Paschal lamb and the purpose for which it is offered, as long as one did not uproot the animal’s status as a Paschal lamb at the time of slaughter, in an otherwise undetermined situation, it certainly stands to be offered for its own purpose; its standing as a Paschal lamb can be changed only if it is explicitly designated as something else. But here, with regard to a Paschal lamb and the people for whom it is slaughtered, in an otherwise undetermined situation, does it stand to be slaughtered for those who are registered to eat it?

This is not the case, for in the instance of every Paschal lamb, there is the possibility that perhaps these will withdraw and others will come and register for it. For we learned in a mishna: People can register for a particular Paschal lamb and withdraw from it until it is slaughtered. Therefore, it is possible that this Paschal lamb will not be suitable for its subscribers at the time of its slaughter, and it makes sense to distinguish between a situation in which one explicitly stated that it is for people who can eat it, in which case it is valid even if he intended it also for people who cannot eat it, and a situation in which he did not make an explicit statement. This is different from slaughtering a Paschal lamb not in its time, for in that case the offering maintains its previous status as a Paschal lamb until its status is explicitly changed through a verbal statement.

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to a Paschal lamb that one slaughtered on the rest of the days of the year with a change of owner, i.e., he slaughtered it not for the sake of its original owner, what is its status? Is a change of owner like a change of sanctity? A Paschal lamb whose sanctity is changed to that of a peace-offering now has the status of a peace-offering, and so too, a Paschal lamb that is slaughtered not for the sake of its original owner, an intention that at its proper time would disqualify the sacrifice, now has the status of a peace-offering. And it validates it, for a peace-offering that was slaughtered not for the sake of its original owner is valid. Or, perhaps not, for it remains a Paschal lamb and is disqualified.

Rav Pappa said: I raised this question in the presence of Rava and expressed my opinion: Since a change in sanctity invalidates it as an offering in its proper time, as if one intended it in its proper time as a peace-offering it is invalid, and a change in owner, i.e., one intended that the offering be for someone other than its owner, also invalidates it in its proper time, the following analogy is made: Just as a change in sanctity, which invalidates it in its proper time, validates it as an offering after its proper time, a change in owner, which invalidates it in its proper time, also validates it as an offering after its proper time.

And Rava said to me: No, this analogy is not to be accepted: If you say this about a change in sanctity, it is because the disqualification it causes is in the offering itself, for the disqualification relates to the very sanctity of the offering, and it applies to all four of the rites, for the disqualification caused by a change in sanctity can occur not only during the slaughter but also during any of the four rites performed with an offering.