The Gemara asks: And do you learn this halakha from here? But isn’t it already stated: ''Speak to Aaron and to his sons, saying: This is the law of the sin offering: In the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered shall the sin offering be slaughtered before the Lord; it is most holy'' (Leviticus 6:18)? If so, to what purpose was this singled out? Why did the Torah state explicitly that the sin offering of the king requires slaughter in the north? The Gemara answers: To fix a place for it, that this is the only place where a sin offering may be slaughtered, teaching that if it was not slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard, the offering is disqualified even after the fact.

The Gemara asks: Do you say that it is singled out for this purpose, to teach that even after the fact a sin offering slaughtered anywhere other than in the north is disqualified? Or perhaps it is only to teach that this goat sin offering requires slaughter in the north but no other goat sin offering requires slaughter in the north. The Gemara answers: The verse states: ''And he shall place his hand upon the head of the sin offering, and slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering'' (Leviticus 4:29). This established a paradigm for all sin offerings, teaching that they require slaughter in the north.

The Gemara continues its explanation: We have found that the Torah writes with regard to the goat sin offering of a king that it requires slaughter in the north both to perform the mitzva in the optimal manner and to disqualify the offering even after the fact. We have also found with regard to the other sin offerings that the Torah states that to perform the mitzva in the optimal manner they must be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard. From where do we derive the halakha to disqualify other sin offerings if they were not slaughtered in the north?

The Gemara explains: As it is written with regard to a lamb sin offering that it must be slaughtered in the north: ''And slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering'' (Leviticus 4:33) and it is also written with regard to a she-goat sin offering: ''And he shall place his hand upon the head of the sin offering, and slaughter it for a sin offering in the place of the burnt offering'' (Leviticus 4:29). This repetition teaches that a sin offering is disqualified if it is not slaughtered in the north.

§ Having derived from these verses that all sin offerings are disqualified if they are slaughtered not in the north, the Gemara questions its earlier explanation. Rather, why do I need the term ''it'' stated with regard to the sin offering of a king in the verse: ''And he shall place his hand upon the head of the goat, and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering'' (Leviticus 4:24)?

The Gemara answers: It is required for that which is taught in a baraita: It, the goat sin offering of a king, is slaughtered in the north of the Tabernacle, but the goat offered by Nahshon and the other princes was not slaughtered in the north. Nahshon was the prince of the tribe of Judah. He, along with all the other princes of the tribes, brought offerings to inaugurate the altar and the Tabernacle, as recorded in the Torah (Numbers, chapter 7). Although the offerings were classified as sin offerings because they shared some characteristics of sin offerings, they were not brought to atone for any particular sin. Therefore, the term ''it'' teaches that the offerings of the princes did not require slaughter in the north.

And the reason that it is necessary for the Torah to exclude Nahshon’s sin offering from the requirement of slaughter in the north is because it is taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to the sin offering of a king: ''And he shall place his hand upon the head of the goat, and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering'' (Leviticus 4:24). The verse could have stated: Upon its head. The reason it adds ''of the goat'' is to include the goat brought as a sin offering by Nahshon in the requirement of placing hands on the head of an offering. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: The term ''of the goat'' serves to include the goats brought as sin offerings for communal idol worship in the requirement of placing hands on the head of an offering.

The Gemara explains: It might enter your mind to say that since the sin offerings of the princes are included in the requirement of placing hands, they are also included in the requirement of being slaughtered in the north. Therefore, the term ''it'' teaches us that for the goat brought as a sin offering by Nahshon and the other princes there was no requirement of slaughter in the north.

Ravina objects to this interpretation: This works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that the offering of Nahshon required him to place his hands on the head of the animal. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, what is there to say? Why should the Torah write the term ''it,'' since there is no reason to assume that it would require slaughter in the north?

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Tavi, said to Ravina: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, does it work out well? Why is it necessary for the Torah to specifically exclude the offerings of the princes from the requirement of slaughter in the north? Why not say that for that for which it was included, i.e., placing hands on the head of an animal, it was included, and for that which it was not included, i.e., slaughter in the north, it was not included.

And if you would say that if the verse had not excluded the offerings of the princes I would say that one could derive the requirement for slaughter in the north via a paradigm from all other sin offerings, if so, one could also derive the requirement for placing hands on the head of an animal itself via the same paradigm. Rather, the reason that the requirement of placing hands cannot be derived via a paradigm is that we do not learn the requirements of the sin offering of Nahshon, which was only for the time of the inauguration of the Tabernacle alone, from the requirement of sin offerings applicable to all generations. So too, the requirement of slaughter in the north cannot be derived via a paradigm because we do not learn the requirements of the sin offering of Nahshon from the requirement of sin offerings applicable to all generations.

Rather, the term ''it'' stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that it must be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard, but the one who slaughters it does not need to stand in the north when he slaughters it.

The Gemara challenges this: The halakha of the one who slaughters the offering has already been derived from the statement of Rabbi Aḥiyya, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Aḥiyya says: The verse states with regard to the burnt offering: ''And he shall slaughter it on the side of the altar northward before the Lord'' (Leviticus 1:11). Why must the verse state the exclusionary term ''it''?

He explains: Since we have found that the priest stands in the north and collects the blood from the neck of the animal in the north, and if he stood in the south and collected the blood in the north the offering is disqualified, one might have thought that this is so also with regard to this one who slaughters the offering. Therefore, the verse states: ''And he shall slaughter it,'' to teach that it, the animal, must be in the north, but the one who slaughters it is not required to be standing in the north of the Temple courtyard when he slaughters the animal. Therefore, the question must be addressed: What is derived from the exclusionary term ''it'' stated with regard to the sin offering of a king?

The Gemara explains: Rather, the term ''it'' stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that it, a goat brought as a sin offering, must be slaughtered in the north, but a young bird brought as an offering does not need to be killed in the north. This is as it is taught in a baraita: One might have thought that a male bird requires pinching of the nape in the north of the Temple courtyard. And this can be derived through a logical inference: Just as a young sheep brought as a burnt offering is an offering for which the Torah did not fix that its slaughter must be performed by a priest but nevertheless fixed that its slaughter must be in the north, with regard to a young bird brought as an offering, for which the Torah did fix that its killing must be performed by a priest, is it not logical that the Torah should also fix its slaughter in the north? Therefore, the verse states ''it,'' to exclude a male bird from the requirement of being killed in the north.

The Gemara questions the logical inference. One cannot derive the halakha of a bird offering from the halakha of a sheep offering, as what is notable about a young sheep offering? It is notable in that the Torah fixed the requirement that it be slaughtered with a utensil, i.e., a knife. A bird, by contrast, is killed by the priest using his fingernail. Therefore, the term ''it'' cannot serve to counter this derivation.

The Gemara explains: Rather, the term ''it'' stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that it, the goat of the king, is slaughtered in the north, but the Paschal offering is not slaughtered in the north.

As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: One might have thought that a Paschal offering requires slaughter in the north. And this can be derived through a logical inference: Just as a burnt offering is an offering for which the Torah did not fix a time for its slaughter but fixed that it requires slaughter in the north, with regard to a Paschal offering, for which the Torah fixed a time for its slaughter, as it must be slaughtered in the afternoon of the fourteenth day of Nisan, is it not logical that the Torah would fix that it must be slaughtered in the north? Therefore, the verse states ''it,'' to exclude the Paschal offering from the requirement of slaughter in the north.

The Gemara questions the logical inference. One cannot derive the halakha of a Paschal offering from the halakha of a burnt offering, as what is notable about a burnt offering? It is notable in that the Torah teaches that it is entirely burned on the altar. This is not so with regard to a Paschal offering.

The Gemara continues: If you would suggest a logical inference from the halakha of a sin offering, which is not entirely burned upon the altar but is slaughtered only in the north, this too can be refuted. As what is notable about a sin offering? It is notable in that it atones for those sins that render one liable for punishment by karet, which is not so with regard to a Paschal offering.

The Gemara continues: If you would suggest a logical inference from the halakha of a guilt offering, which is not entirely burned, which does not atone for those sins punishable by karet, and which is slaughtered only in the north, this too can be refuted. As what is notable about a guilt offering? It is notable in that it has the status of an offering of the most sacred order, which is not so with regard to a Paschal offering. The Gemara adds: Having noted this distinction between a guilt offering and a Paschal offering, one can say that for all of the three offerings as well, the halakha of a Paschal offering cannot be derived from them, since they all have the status of offerings of the most sacred order.

The Gemara returns to the earlier inference: Actually, the term ''it'' teaches as we said initially: It, i.e., the animal, must be standing in the north, but the one who slaughters the animal does not have to stand in the north. And that which is difficult for you, that we derive this halakha from the statement of Rabbi Aḥiyya, is in fact not difficult. The derivation from the term ''it'' is not to exclude one who slaughters from the requirement to slaughter in the north, since that halakha is known already from the statement of Rabbi Aḥiyya. Rather, the derivation is that it is only one who slaughters the animal who does not have to stand in the north, but by inference, the one who collects the blood from the neck of the animal must stand in the north.

The Gemara questions this inference: The halakha that the one who collects the blood from the neck of the animal must stand in the north is derived from the fact that the Torah could have written: The priest shall take, and instead writes: ''And the priest shall take'' [velakaḥ] (Leviticus 4:34), which may be read as: He will take himself [lo yikaḥ], as explained on the previous amud. The Gemara explains: This tanna does not learn anything from this distinction between: The priest shall take, and: ''And the priest shall take.'' He does not agree with this derivation, and therefore he must derive the requirement to collect the blood while standing in the north from a different verse.

§ The Gemara asks: We found a source for the requirement of slaughter in the north with regard to a burnt offering in order to perform the mitzva in the optimal manner. We also found a source for the requirement of collecting the blood while standing in the north in order to perform the mitzva in the optimal manner. From where do we derive that slaughter and collection of the blood are disqualified if they are not performed in the north?

Rav Adda bar Ahava says, and some say it was Rabba bar Sheila who says: It is derived via an a fortiori inference: Just as the halakha that the slaughter and blood collection of a sin offering be performed in the north comes by virtue of a comparison to the halakha of a burnt offering, as the verse states: ''And slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering'' (Leviticus 4:29), yet if the animal was not slaughtered or its blood was not collected in the north it disqualifies the offering, with regard to the burnt offering itself, as the halakha that the slaughter and blood collection of a sin offering be in the north comes by virtue of it, is it not logical that if it was not slaughtered or its blood was not collected in the north, this should disqualify the offering?

The Gemara rejects this logical inference: What is notable about a sin offering? It is notable in that it atones for those sins that render one liable for punishment by karet, which is not so with regard to a burnt offering.

Ravina said: This is what is difficult for Rav Adda bar Ahava. In other words, regardless of the notable characteristic of a sin offering, he still is of the opinion that his logical inference stands. Have we ever found that a secondary prohibition is more stringent than a primary prohibition? Since the halakha of a sin offering is derived via a comparison to the halakha of a burnt offering, the former cannot have stringencies that the latter lacks.

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: But have we not found a secondary prohibition that is more stringent than the primary one?