§ The mishna teaches: With regard to the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur, their slaughter is in the north and the collection of their blood in a service vessel is in the north. The Gemara asks: Why does the mishna list these sin offerings first? After all, while the halakha that slaughter must be in the north of the Temple courtyard is written in the Torah with regard to a burnt offering (Leviticus 1:11), the Torah does not explicitly state that the other offerings must be slaughtered in the north. Therefore, let the tanna of the mishna teach the halakha of a burnt offering first.

The Gemara answers: Since the location for slaughtering the sin offering is derived through interpretation, it is dear to the tanna, and he therefore he gives it precedence. The verse states: ''Speak to Aaron and to his sons, saying: This is the law of the sin offering: In the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered shall the sin offering be slaughtered before the Lord; it is most holy'' (Leviticus 6:18). The Gemara (55a) derives from this verse that the sin offering must be slaughtered in the same place as the burnt offering, i.e., in the north of the Temple courtyard.

The Gemara challenges: But let the tanna of the mishna teach first the halakha of the external sin offerings, since those are the offerings to which the verse is referring. The Gemara explains: Since the blood of the Yom Kippur sin offerings enters the innermost sanctum, these offerings are dear to the tanna, and he taught them first.

The Gemara asks: And where is it written that a burnt offering must be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard? The Gemara answers that with regard to a sheep that is brought as a burnt offering the Torah states: ''And he shall slaughter it on the side of the altar northward before the Lord; and Aaron’s sons, the priests, shall dash its blood against the altar round about'' (Leviticus 1:11).

The Gemara clarifies: We have found that this verse provides a source that a young sheep burnt offering must be slaughtered in the north. From where do we derive that a young bull burnt offering must also be slaughtered in the north? The Gemara answers: The verse states: ''And if his offering be of the flock, whether of the sheep, or of the goats, for a burnt offering, he shall offer it a male without blemish'' (Leviticus 1:10). The conjunctive ''and'' represented by the letter vav adds to the previous matter. The previous passage addresses cattle offerings. And let the upper passage, the place of the slaughter of a bull, be learned from the lower passage, the place of slaughtering a sheep.

The Gemara comments: This works out well according to the one who says that we learn halakhot in this manner. But according to the one who says that we do not learn halakhot in this manner, what is there to say?

As it is taught in a baraita: Immediately following the passage in the Torah addressing a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property, the Torah discusses the halakhot of a provisional guilt offering, brought by one who is uncertain as to whether he committed a sin that requires a sin offering. The verse states: ''And if anyone sin, and does any of the commandments which the Lord has commanded not to be done, though he did not know it, yet is he guilty, and shall bear his iniquity'' (Leviticus 5:17). This serves to render him liable to bring a provisional guilt offering for uncertain misuse of consecrated property; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. And the Rabbis deem him exempt in such a case. The Gemara suggests: What, is it not that they disagree with regard to this: One Sage, Rabbi Akiva, holds that we learn halakhot of the upper passage from the lower passage, and the other Sage, i.e., the Rabbis, holds that we do not learn halakhot in this manner?

Rav Pappa said: This is not correct, as everyone holds that we learn halakhot of the upper passage from the lower passage. And this is the reason that the Rabbis exempt from bringing an offering one who is uncertain whether he misused consecrated property: They learn a verbal analogy. It is stated here: ''And if anyone sin, and does any of the commandments which the Lord has commanded not to be done'' (Leviticus 5:17). And it is stated with regard to the sin offering for eating forbidden fat: ''And if any one of the common people sin through error, in doing any of the commandments which the Lord has commanded not to be done, and be guilty'' (Leviticus 4:27).

The verbal analogy teaches that just as there, the sin offering is brought only for an act that for its intentional violation one is liable to be punished with karet, and for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin offering, so too here, one brings a provisional guilt offering only for an act that for its intentional violation one is liable to be punished with karet, and for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin offering, which is not the case concerning misuse of consecrated property.

The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Akiva derive from this verbal analogy? He learns that just as there the verse obligates one to bring a fixed sin offering, so too here, with regard to the provisional guilt offering, one brings it for a case of uncertain transgression of a prohibition for which one would be liable to bring a fixed sin offering, to exclude a sin offering brought for uncertain transgression of the defiling of the Temple or sacrificial foods, as the sin offering for that transgression is not fixed, but is a sliding-scale offering. If the sinner is poor he brings a meal offering or a bird offering; if he is rich he brings an animal offering. In a case of uncertainty one does not bring a provisional guilt offering.

And as for the Rabbis, who derived a different halakha from the verbal analogy, they hold that there is no verbal analogy for half of a matter. Once a provisional guilt offering is compared to a sin offering, it must be completely similar, and both matters are derived from the verbal analogy. The Gemara asks: But Rabbi Akiva also must hold that there is no verbal analogy for half of a matter, so why does he not agree with the derivation of the Rabbis?

The Gemara reconsiders: Yes, this is indeed so. And here they disagree with regard to this: Rabbi Akiva holds that it is written with regard to the provisional guilt offering: ''And if anyone sin, and does any of the commandments which the Lord has commanded not to be done, though he did not know it, yet is he guilty, and shall bear his iniquity'' (Leviticus 5:17). The word ''and'' represented by the letter vav adds to the previous matter. When a phrase begins with the conjunction vav, it is a continuation of the previous matter, and the halakhot of the previous passage can be learned from the subsequent passage. Therefore one brings a provisional guilt offering for uncertain misuse of consecrated property.

The Gemara asks: But according to the opinion of the Rabbis also, isn’t it written: ''And if anyone sin''? Let us say that they disagree about this: As one Sage, Rabbi Akiva, holds that a derivation from a juxtaposition is preferable, and derives from the juxtaposition of the halakhot of misuse of consecrated property to the halakhot of a provisional guilt offering that one is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering if he is not certain whether he misused consecrated property. And one Sage, i.e., the Rabbis, holds that a derivation from a verbal analogy is preferable, and therefore derive from a verbal analogy between the passage of misuse of consecrated property and the passage of a sin offering for eating forbidden fat that one is not liable to bring a provisional guilt offering if he is not certain whether he misused consecrated property.

The Gemara rejects this: No, it may be that everyone agrees that a derivation from a juxtaposition is preferable. And the Rabbis would say to you that the reason one is exempt from bringing a provisional guilt offering in a case of uncertain mis-use of consecrated property is that the juxtaposition should be understood in the opposite manner. It is the lower passage that is derived from the upper passage.

The juxtaposition teaches that a provisional guilt offering must be a ram worth a minimum of two silver shekels, as is the halakha with regard to the offering brought for misuse of consecrated property. This derivation is needed so that you should not say that a provisional guilt offering, brought for his uncertain transgression, should not be more stringent than the offering one brings in a case of his definite transgression. According to that claim, one would say that just as for his definite transgression one may bring a sin offering worth only one-sixth [danka] of a dinar, so too, for his uncertain transgression one may bring a provisional guilt offering worth only one-sixth of a dinar.

The Gemara asks: And from where does Rabbi Akiva derive this conclusion? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the verse that states: ''And this is the law of the guilt offering'' (Leviticus 7:1), which teaches that there is one law for all of the guilt offerings and they must all be worth at least two shekels, provisional guilt offerings included.

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to one who holds that there is a derivation from the word ''law,'' but according to the one who does not hold that there is a derivation from the word ''law,'' from where does he learn that all guilt offerings must have the same minimum value? The Gemara answers: He learns it from a verbal analogy between the term ''according to your valuation'' stated with regard to a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property (Leviticus 5:15) and the term ''according to your valuation'' stated with regard to a provisional guilt offering (Leviticus 5:18) and a guilt offering for robbery (Leviticus 5:25).

The Gemara asks: This works out well concerning guilt offerings where it is written ''according to your valuation,'' but with regard to a guilt offering brought for engaging in sexual intercourse with an espoused maidservant, concerning which it is not written in the Torah ''according to your valuation,'' what is there to say? How does one derive that the guilt offering brought for engaging in sexual intercourse with an espoused maidservant must be worth a minimum of two silver shekels?

The Gemara answers that it is derived from a verbal analogy between the term ''with the ram'' stated with regard to a guilt offering for mis-use of consecrated property (Leviticus 5:16) and the term ''with the ram'' stated with regard to the guilt offering for engaging in sexual intercourse with an espoused maidservant (Leviticus 19:22).

§ The Gemara returns to discuss the mishna. From where do we derive that a sin offering requires slaughter in the north of the Temple courtyard? The Gemara answers: As it is written with regard to an individual sin offering: ''And he shall place his hand upon the head of the sin offering, and slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering'' (Leviticus 4:29). Just as a burnt offering must be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard, so too, a sin offering must also be slaughtered in the north.

The Gemara asks: We have found from this verse that the slaughter must be in the north. From where do we derive that collection of the blood must also be in the north? The Gemara answers: As it is written: ''And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger and place it upon the corners of the altar of burnt offering, and all its remaining blood he shall pour out at the base of the altar'' (Leviticus 4:34). As this verse immediately follows the verse discussing the slaughter of a sin offering, evidently the taking of the blood is performed in the same place as the slaughter.

The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that the one collecting the blood must himself stand in the north of the Temple courtyard? Perhaps he may stand near the north and extend his arm to collect the blood. The Gemara answers that the verse states: ''And the priest shall take [velakaḥ]'' (Leviticus 4:34), which can be read, as: He will take himself [lo yikkaḥ].

The Gemara asks: We have found that the offering must be slaughtered in the north and the blood collected in the north to perform the mitzva in the optimal manner. From where is it derived that if one slaughters the offering or collects the blood anywhere else the offering is disqualified? The Gemara answers: It is written in another verse which speaks of a goat sin offering brought by a king who sins: ''And he shall place his hand upon the head of the goat and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering'' (Leviticus 4:24). And it is taught in a baraita: Where is the burnt offering slaughtered? In the north. This sin offering of a king must also be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard.