GEMARA: The Gemara discusses the first clause of the mishna: Granted that one is liable in a case where he first placed the blood on an altar outside the courtyard and then placed the remaining blood on the altar inside the courtyard; that is because, as the mishna explains: As the blood in its entirety is fit to be placed inside the courtyard. But in a case where he first placed its blood on the altar inside the courtyard and then offered up the remaining blood on an altar outside the courtyard, why he is liable? That blood is merely a remainder, and one should not be liable for offering it up outside.

The Gemara explains: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, who says: For the remainder of the blood of an offering that was supposed to be poured at the base of the altar and that instead one sacrificed outside the courtyard, one is liable.

The Gemara asks: If the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, then say the latter clause: If one collected its blood in two cups and placed the blood from both of them on the altar inside the courtyard, he is exempt. If he placed the blood from both of them on an altar outside the courtyard, he is liable. If he first placed the blood from one cup inside and then placed the blood from the other one outside, he is exempt. By using the blood of the first cup to perform the mitzva of placing the blood on the altar, he thereby rendered the blood in the second cup a mere remainder. The Gemara asks: How can this clause be attributed to Rabbi Neḥemya? But doesn’t Rabbi Neḥemya say: For the remainder of the blood of an offering that one offered outside the courtyard, he is liable?

The Gemara answers: In the latter clause we arrive at the opinion of the first tanna, who disagrees with Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon. As that tanna says: The placement of the blood from one cup renders the blood of the other cup as disqualified. Since it is actually disqualified and not merely a remainder, one is not liable for offering it up outside.

§ The mishna presents an analogy for its ruling: To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to a case where one separated an animal for his sin offering and it was lost, and he separated another animal in its place, and thereafter, the first animal was found.

The Gemara asks: Why do I need to ask: To what is this matter comparable, and provide an analogy to the mishna’s rulings? What does the analogy add? The Gemara explains: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who says (see Temura 22b): A sin offering that was lost during the time of the separation of a substitute, if it is later found and one of them is slaughtered as the person’s sin offering, the other one is put to death. Accordingly, it is actually disqualified from being used as an offering, and one is therefore not liable for offering it up outside.

And this is what the mishna is saying by presenting its analogy: The reason that one is exempt from liability for offering up the unused sin offering outside is that it was lost at the time its substitute was separated and therefore it is considered disqualified. But if one separated two sin offerings from the outset as a guarantee, so that even if one is lost he can use the other, then if neither is lost and he sacrifices one of them, the other one is not put to death. Rather, it is left to graze until it becomes blemished, at which point it is sold and the proceeds used to purchase a voluntary burnt offering. It emerges that from the outset, one of these two animals, i.e., the one that was not ultimately sacrificed as his sin offering, is a burnt offering, and therefore if one offers it up outside the courtyard he is liable. The analogy teaches that with regard to blood collected in two cups, if one offers up blood from the unused cup outside, he is exempt only because the blood in that cup is considered disqualified, but he would not be exempt if it was considered a remainder.

And this is in accordance with the statement that Rav Huna says that Rav says, as Rav Huna says that Rav says: A guilt offering that was consigned to grazing per the halakha to leave it to graze if its owner dies or achieves atonement through another guilt offering, and then instead of being left to develop a blemish, at which point it could be sold and the proceeds used to purchase a voluntary burnt offering, one slaughtered it, even with unspecified intent, the animal itself is fit to be sacrificed as a burnt offering. Similarly, the mishna assumes that in any case where an animal is consigned to grazing it is considered fit, and one would be liable for slaughtering it outside the courtyard.

The Gemara asks: Are these cases comparable? There, in Rav’s ruling, it is logical that the animal is considered fit, as a guilt offering is a male animal and a burnt offering is a male animal, so it is possible to bring an animal as the latter even if it had been designated as the former. Therefore, a guilt offering left to graze is still considered fit. But in the mishna’s case, just because the animal is left to graze does not necessarily indicate that it itself is fit to be brought, as a sin offering is a female animal, which can never be brought as a burnt offering. Therefore, it should be considered unfit. Rav Ḥiyya from Yostiniyya said: The ruling of the mishna is with regard to the goat of the Nasi, which is a male sin offering. Therefore, in a case where it is left to graze it is still considered fit, as it can be brought as a burnt offering.
This chapter discussed two distinct prohibitions: That of slaughtering an offering outside the Temple courtyard and that of offering up an offering by placing it upon an altar outside the Temple courtyard. Since they are considered two distinct prohibitions, one is liable even if he performs only one of them, and he is liable twice if he performs both.

MISHNA: With regard to the red heifer of purification that one burned outside its pit, the pit being an excavation on the Mount of Olives opposite the entrance to the Sanctuary designated for its slaughter and its burning, and likewise the scapegoat that one sacrificed outside the Temple courtyard rather than casting it off a cliff as prescribed, he is exempt from punishment for violating the transgression of slaughtering and sacrificing outside the Temple courtyard.

The source for this is as it is stated with regard to slaughter of sacrificial animals outside the courtyard: ''Whatever man…that slaughters outside the camp, and to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it, to present it as an offering to the Lord before the Tabernacle of the Lord'' (Leviticus 17:3–4). From that verse it is derived: For any offering that is not fit to come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting for sacrifice on the altar, e.g., the red heifer and the scapegoat, one is not liable for its slaughter and sacrifice outside its place.

With regard to an animal that actively copulated with a person, or an animal that was the object of bestiality, or an animal that was set aside for idol worship, or an animal that was worshipped as a deity, or an animal given as the price of a dog that was purchased, or an animal that was given as payment to a prostitute, or an animal born of a mixture of diverse kinds, or an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [tereifa], or an animal born by caesarean section, any of which one sacrificed outside the Temple courtyard, he is exempt.

The source for this is as it is stated: ''And to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it to present it as an offering to the Lord before the Tabernacle of the Lord.'' From this verse, it is derived: For any animal that is not fit to come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting for sacrifice on the altar, one is not liable for its slaughter and sacrifice outside the courtyard.

For blemished animals, whether they are permanently blemished or whether they are