And if the animal whose year passed was found before the owner achieved atonement, the found animal shall graze until it becomes blemished [shetista’ev], at which point it may not be sacrificed; and it shall be sold and the owner shall purchase another animal with the money received from its sale. The animal that was found blemished may be sold immediately, and the owner shall purchase another animal with the money received from its sale. In both cases, the animal renders a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute, and one who derives benefit from it is liable for misusing it.

GEMARA: The mishna first groups together three cases of sin offerings that are left to die, after which it discusses the other two as another group. The Gemara asks: What is different about the three cases in the first clause that the mishna does not distinguish between whether or not the owner has achieved atonement, and what is different about the latter clause that the mishna does distinguish between cases where the owner has and has not achieved atonement?

The Gemara answers: The three cases of sin offerings discussed in the first clause are absolute, i.e., the halakha is the same whether or not the owner has achieved atonement. By contrast, the cases of the other two sin offerings discussed in the latter clause are not absolute, as their status depends on whether or not their owner achieved atonement by means of another offering.

The Gemara asks: Didn’t the Mishna teach this same halakha verbatim in connection with the topic of substitution, in tractate Temura (21b)? Why is it repeated here? The Gemara answers: It is taught there, in Temura, because it discusses the halakhot of substitution, and it is taught again here in tractate Me’ila because it discusses the halakhot of misuse.

MISHNA: In the case of a nazirite who designated money for the three offerings he is obligated to bring upon completion of his naziriteship, a sin offering, a burnt offering, and a peace offering, but he did not specify which money was designated for which offering, since it is not clear what the money is intended for, one may not derive benefit from the money ab initio, but if he derived benefit from the money he is not liable for its misuse. This is due to the fact that all the money is fit for purchase of the peace offering, for which one is liable for misuse only after its blood is sprinkled, and therefore there is no liability for its misuse.

If the nazirite died and he had undesignated funds, meaning he did not specify which money was for each of the three offerings, all the money will be allocated for purchase of communal gift offerings. If the nazirite died and he had specified money, the money specified for purchase of the sin offering shall go to the Dead Sea for disposal, because one may not derive benefit ab initio from the money of a sin offering whose owner has died. But if it was not disposed of, and one derived benefit from the money, he is not liable for its misuse.

With the money specified for purchase of the burnt offering, one shall bring a gift burnt offering, and one is liable for misusing the funds. With the money specified for purchase of the peace offering, one shall bring a gift peace offering. Although it is a gift offering, the restrictions of the peace offering of the naziriteship apply, and therefore it is eaten for one day and that same night, not the standard two days and one night of a regular peace offering. And nevertheless the peace offering does not require the bringing of the loaves that accompany the peace offering of naziriteship, as it is written with regard to the loaves: ''And shall place them on the hands of the nazirite'' (Numbers 6:19), and in this case the nazirite is dead.

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if a nazirite designated money for the three offerings that he is obligated to bring upon completion of his naziriteship but did not specify which money was designated for which offering, one who derived benefit from the money is not liable for its misuse, as all the money is fit for purchase of the peace offering. Reish Lakish objects to this: And let the tanna of the mishna also teach a similar halakha with regard to one who was obligated to bring a pair of birds as an offering in a purification ritual, e.g., for a leper or a woman who gave birth, and he designated money for those nests, i.e., the bird offerings, but did not specify which money was for the burnt offering and which was for the sin offering.

Reish Lakish elaborates: Here too, the tanna could have stated that one may not derive benefit from the money ab initio, but if he derived benefit from it he is not liable for its misuse. This is due to the fact that that all the money is fit for purchase of doves whose time of fitness for sacrifice has not yet arrived, as they are fit for sacrifice only when they are older; or pigeons whose time of fitness has passed, which are fit only when they are young. Since these are not fit to be sacrificed, one is not liable for misuse.

Rava says in response: This halakha is not included in the mishna because the two cases are not comparable: In the case of the undesignated money, the Torah said to bring a peace offering as one of the obligatory offerings of a nazirite. Since any part of the money may be used to purchase the peace offering, there is no liability for its misuse. By contrast, in the case of one who designated money for bird offerings, did the Torah say to use this money to bring specifically doves whose time of fitness has not arrived? Such birds are not fit to be sacrificed on the altar. Therefore, it cannot be said this money is intended for a purpose that does not entail liability for misuse.

MISHNA: Rabbi Shimon says: With regard to misuse of the blood of offerings that is to be sprinkled on the altar, the halakha is lenient with regard to the status of the blood at the outset and stringent at its conclusion. With regard to misuse of the wine of the libations that accompany the offerings, the halakha is stringent with regard to the status of the wine at their outset and lenient at their conclusion.

The mishna explains: With regard to blood, at its outset, before it is sprinkled on the altar, one is not liable for misusing it; but once its remainder has been poured on the base of the altar and it emerges via the canal that runs through the Temple to the Kidron Valley at the foot of the Temple Mount, one is liable for misusing it. With regard to libations, at their outset, from the moment they were consecrated, one is liable for misusing them, but once they have descended to the drainpipes built into the altar and which extend beneath it, through which the libations flowed out of the Temple, one is no longer liable for misusing them, as their mitzva was fulfilled and therefore their sanctity has ceased.

GEMARA: The Gemara cites a baraita relating to the mishna’s ruling that once the remainder of the blood emerged via the canal that runs through the Temple one is liable for its misuse. The Sages taught in a baraita: One is liable for misusing the blood of the offerings after it has emerged via the canal that runs through the Temple to the Kidron Valley. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon. And the Rabbis say: One is not liable for misusing the blood.

The Gemara asks: What is the reason of the one who says that one is not liable for misusing the blood, despite the fact that it comes from a consecrated offering? Ulla said that blood is not consecrated, because the verse states: ''For the life of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it to you upon the altar to atone for your souls'' (Leviticus 17:11). ''To you'' indicates that it shall be yours, and it is not the property of the Temple. A Sage of the school of Rabbi Yishmael likewise taught that the term ''to atone'' teaches that God says: I gave it for atonement, and not for the prohibition against misuse of consecrated property.

Rabbi Yoḥanan says this halakha is derived from a different phrase, as the verse states: ''For it is the blood that atones by reason of the life'' (Leviticus 17:11). The word ''is'' teaches that the blood remains as it is, retaining the same status before atonement as after atonement: Just as after atonement it is not subject to the prohibition against misuse of consecrated property, as the mitzva has been performed, so too, before atonement it is not subject to misuse of consecrated property.

The Gemara asks: But if the basis for this halakha is that the status of blood remains the same before and after atonement, one can say the opposite, that its status after atonement should be like its status before atonement: Just as before atonement it is subject to misuse of consecrated property, so too, after atonement it is subject to misuse of consecrated property.

The Gemara rejects this contention with a rhetorical question: Is there anything whose mitzva has been performed and it is still subject to misuse of consecrated property? The Gemara challenges this assumption: Why not? Why not say this; is there really no precedent for such a suggestion?