All the Syrian cakes are prohibited, but the Syrian cakes of Baitos are permitted? The Gemara responds: With regard to the case there, Mar, son of Rav Ashi, said: His belt is proof for him, as in those days people commonly had one belt, which was worn over the shirt. If a person had more than one shirt, then whenever he laundered one he would remove the belt and wear it over the second. If one saw a shirt being washed with its belt, he would know that the owner had only one shirt.

MISHNA: In the case of a drop of milk that fell on a piece of meat, if the drop contains enough milk to impart flavor to that piece of meat, i.e., the meat is less than sixty times the size of the drop, the meat is forbidden. If one stirred the contents of the pot and the piece was submerged in the gravy before it absorbed the milk, if the drop contains enough milk to impart flavor to the contents of that entire pot, the contents of the entire pot are forbidden.

GEMARA: Abaye said: The principle that the flavor of a forbidden food renders prohibited the substance in which it is absorbed, and it is not necessary for there to be actual forbidden substance, applies by Torah law in general, and not just to the prohibition of meat cooked in milk.

As, if it enters your mind that the principle applies to other prohibited foods by rabbinic law, one can claim: What is the reason that we do not learn that it applies by Torah law from the analogous case of meat cooked in milk? It must be because the prohibition of meat cooked in milk is a novelty that is not derived through logical reasoning, as each substance is separately permitted, and they are prohibited only when cooked together. No analogies can be drawn to a novelty. But if the prohibition is a novelty, then even if there is not enough milk to impart flavor, the meat and milk should also be prohibited. Since the measure of the prohibition follows the standard principles of mixtures, the prohibition itself is apparently not a novelty. One may therefore draw an analogy to other mixtures, inferring that this measure applies to them by Torah law as well.

Rava said to Abaye: This is not a valid proof. The prohibition of meat cooked in milk is in fact a novelty and differs from other prohibited mixtures. Nevertheless, its measure is the imparting of flavor only because the action the Torah prohibited is in the manner of cooking, and cooking involves the imparting of flavor.

§ The mishna teaches that if the piece of meat acquires the flavor of milk, it is forbidden. Rav says: Once the milk imparts flavor to the piece of meat, the piece itself becomes non-kosher meat in its own right. And therefore, if one did not immediately remove the piece from the pot, it renders all the pieces of meat in the pot forbidden, even if they are together more than sixty times the size of that forbidden piece. This is because they are the same type as the forbidden piece, and as a rule, a substance in contact with the same type of substance cannot be nullified.

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: Now consider, in accordance with whose opinion did Rav say his halakha? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said that a type of food mixed with food of its own type is not nullified. If so, shall we say that Rav disagrees with Rava’s interpretation of Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion?

As Rava said: Rabbi Yehuda holds with regard to any tripartite mixture consisting of a forbidden type of food, a permitted food of the same type, and another food item that is permitted, one disregards the permitted food that is its own type as though it were not there, and if the permitted food that is not of its own type is more than the forbidden food, the permitted food nullifies the forbidden food. In the case Rav describes, although the other pieces of meat are of the same type as the piece that has become forbidden, the gravy in the pot is not of the same type, and it should nullify the forbidden piece. Since Rav does not mention this principle, he apparently disagrees with it.

Ravina said to him: If the forbidden substance fell into thin gravy, Rav would concede that the gravy would indeed nullify the piece of meat, since the two substances are of different types. But here we are dealing with a case where it fell into thick gravy, which is composed of meat residue. Since the gravy is of the same substance as the meat, the forbidden piece is not nullified.

The Gemara returns to Rav’s statement that the piece of meat upon which the milk fell is considered a non-kosher item in its own right. And what does Rav maintain in this regard? If he maintains that an item that can be wrung to remove the forbidden substance it contains becomes permitted again after wringing, then it follows that only the absorbed substance is truly forbidden. If so, why should this piece of meat itself become non-kosher? Once it has been mixed into the stew, the milk it has absorbed should be evenly distributed throughout the pot and be nullified. Rather, Rav must maintain that even an item that can be wrung to remove the forbidden substance is forbidden.

The Gemara elaborates: As it was stated: Rav and Rabbi Ḥanina and Rabbi Yoḥanan say that even an item that can be wrung to remove the forbidden substance is forbidden, whereas Shmuel, and Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and Reish Lakish say: An item that can be wrung to remove the forbidden substance is permitted.

The Gemara asks: And does Rav really maintain that an item that can be wrung to remove the forbidden substance is forbidden? But wasn’t it stated: If an olive-bulk of meat fell into a pot of milk so large that the meat did not impart flavor to it, Rav says: The meat is forbidden, as it absorbed the taste of the milk, but the milk is permitted, since it did not absorb the taste of the meat. But if it enters your mind that according to Rav an item that can be wrung is forbidden,