and everyone, both the first tanna and Rabbi Natan, holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, and derive from this verse that it is necessary that the witnesses see the incident together, i.e., they were both present and observed the incident at the same time. And here, with regard to whether or not the witnesses must testify in court together, they disagree with regard to whether or not the statement of the witnesses, i.e., their testimony in court, is compared to their observation of the incident. One Sage, the first tanna, holds that we compare their statement to their observation. Therefore, just as they must see the incident together, so too, they must testify together in court. And one Sage, Rabbi Natan, holds that we do not compare their statement to their observation.

The Gemara relates: Rabbi Shimon ben Elyakim was striving to ordain Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, and was not successful in his attempts. One day, Rabbi Shimon ben Elyakim was sitting before Rabbi Yoḥanan among Rabbi Yoḥanan’s other students.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to his students: Is there anyone who knows whether the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, or not? Rabbi Shimon ben Elyakim said to him: This one, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, knows. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: If so, let him say. Rabbi Shimon ben Elyakim said to him: Let the Master ordain him first; since we are all in need of his wisdom, he is fit for ordination. Rabbi Yoḥanan then ordained Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: My son, tell me what you heard. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said to him: This is what I heard: That Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa concedes to the opinion of Rabbi Natan that it is unnecessary for the witnesses to testify together.

Rabbi Yoḥanan was disappointed, and said: For this I needed to ordain him? Now that with regard to the main element of testimony, i.e., observing the incident, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says we do not need both witnesses to see it together, with regard to their statement in court, is it necessary to explicate that there is no requirement that they testify together?

Although the statement of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, was unnecessary, Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Since you ascended, i.e., you were ordained, you will not descend, even though it was in error. Rabbi Zeira said: Conclude from it that with regard to a great man, once he is ordained, even if it was due to mistaken judgment, he is ordained. The ordination is not canceled.

As for the halakha in this matter, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin says that Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa that it is unnecessary for the two witnesses to observe the incident together, both with regard to cases of land and with regard to cases of movable property.

Ulla says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa with regard to land, which is unmovable, and therefore both testimonies are certainly about the same piece of land; but not with regard to movable property, as there is a concern that they are not testifying about the same item.

Abaye said to Ulla: If you say that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa with regard to land, by inference you hold that they disagree with regard to this matter. But doesn’t Rabbi Abba say that Rav Huna says that Rav says: The Rabbis concede to the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa with regard to testimony concerning land?

And Rav Idi bar Avin teaches in the halakhot of damages that were taught at the school of the Sage Karna: The Rabbis concede to the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa that the witnesses do not need to see the incident together with regard to testimony concerning a blemish in a male firstborn kosher animal, which renders it permitted to derive benefit from it, and with regard to testimony concerning ownership of land, and with regard to testimony concerning presumptive ownership of land. Since it is clear that they are testifying about the same land, it is unnecessary for them to see it together. And so they concede with regard to testimony over the two pubic hairs of a boy or of a girl, which are a sign of adulthood.

The Gemara rejects Abaye’s question: Are you setting the statement of one man against the statement of another man? One Sage, Ulla, holds that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa even with regard to land, and one Sage, i.e., Rav and Rav Idi, holds that they do not disagree.

The Gemara asks tangentially about the statement: And so they concede with regard to testimony over the two pubic hairs of a boy or of a girl: What is this referring to? If we say it is referring to testimony that a girl has reached majority, in which one witness says that he saw one hair on the her lower back and one witness says that he saw one hair on her lower abdomen, that is difficult. A girl is considered to have reached maturity when she has two pubic hairs. In this case, two witnesses separately testify that they have each seen one hair. In this case each testimony is obviously invalid, as it is half a matter and also half a testimony. Not only does each testimony refer to one hair, which is half a matter, it is submitted by one witness, which is half a testimony. Consequently, it is obvious that the girl is not considered to have reached majority in this case.

Rather, it must be referring to a case where one says that he saw two hairs on her lower back, and the other one says he saw two hairs on her lower abdomen. Since they each testify that she has reached adulthood, it is unnecessary for them to see the same hairs.

Rav Yosef said: I say in the name of Ulla that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa both with regard to land and with regard to movable property. But the Sages who came from Meḥoza say that Rabbi Zeira says in the name of Rav: With regard to land the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, but not with regard to movable property.

The Gemara comments: Rav conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as Rav says: Testimonies of an admission following an admission are combined into one; if one witness testifies that the respondent admitted in his presence that he owes the claimant, and the other witness testifies that the respondent admitted in his presence that he owes the claimant in a separate incident, their testimonies are combined. Likewise, testimonies of an admission following a loan are combined into one; where one witness testifies that the respondent admitted in his presence that he owes the claimant, and the other one testifies that on a previous date the respondent borrowed money from the claimant in his presence, their testimonies are combined.

Rav continues: But testimonies of a loan following a loan are not combined. If one testifies that the claimant lent the respondent one hundred dinars in his presence, and the other testifies that he lent him one hundred dinars in a separate incident in his presence, their testimonies are not combined, as they are clearly testifying about two separate loans. Similarly, testimonies of a loan following an admission are not combined. If one testifies that the claimant lent money to the respondent, and the other one testifies that on an earlier date the respondent admitted to owing the claimant, their testimonies are not combined.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak encountered Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua. He said to him: What is different about a loan following a loan, in which case the testimonies are not combined, as the one hundred dinars that this witness saw, that witness did not see? In the case of an admission following an admission as well, perhaps the one hundred dinars about which the respondent admitted in the presence of this witness, he did not admit in the presence of that witness. Perhaps his admissions were in reference to two separate loans, and therefore the testimonies should not be combined.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, answered him: The reference is to a case where the respondent said to this last witness: With regard to the one hundred dinars that I admitted to owing in your presence, I admitted to owing them in the presence of so-and-so, the first witness, as well.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak asked: Still, the last witness knows that he is testifying about the same loan as the first witness, but the first witness does not know this. Since only one witness testifies that it is the same loan, the testimonies still cannot be combined.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, answered: It is a case where, after his admission to the second witness, the respondent went back and said to the first witness: With regard to those one hundred dinars that I admitted to owing in your presence, I admitted owing them in the presence of so-and-so as well. Therefore, both witnesses know that they are testifying about the same loan. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to him: May your mind be settled, as you have settled my mind and put it at ease by answering this question that was troubling me.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to him: What is settling about this explanation? As Rava, and some say Rav Sheshet, threw an ax at my answer, i.e., he rejected my explanation, as follows: According to this interpretation of the case of an admission following an admission, isn’t this the same as an admission following a loan? The case of an admission following an admission is now rendered superfluous, as it adds no new insight on the matter.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to him: This is what I heard about you Sages of Meḥoza, that you knock down palm trees and erect them, i.e., you build and then destroy what you built. After you came up with such an excellent explanation, you ruined it yourselves.

The Sages of Neharde’a say: Whether it is a case of an admission following an admission, or an admission following a loan, or a loan following a loan, or a loan following an admission, in all these cases the testimonies are combined. In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, who teaches that since both witnesses testify about a debt of one hundred dinars, it is considered like one testimony.

§ Rav Yehuda says: Testimony of two witnesses who contradict the testimony of each other in response to the judges’ examination of the details of the story is valid in cases of monetary law, although a contradiction of this type disqualifies testimony in cases of capital law.

Rava says: The statement of Rav Yehuda is reasonable in a case where one witness says: The money was in a black purse [be’arnaki], and the other one says: It was in a white purse. Since this is a secondary detail, they may not remember it accurately. But if one says: He lent him a black coin, i.e., the coin was dark, and the other one says: He lent him a white coin, the testimonies are not combined. Since they contradict each other with regard to a characteristic of the money itself, one is probably lying.

The Gemara challenges Rabbi Yehuda’s ruling: And if witnesses contradict each other with regard to secondary details such as a black purse in cases of capital law, is it the case that their testimony is not accepted? But doesn’t Rav Ḥisda say: In a case where one of the witnesses says: The murderer killed the victim with a sword, and one of the witnesses says: The murderer killed the victim with an ariran, another type of weapon, this is not congruent testimony, as this is a clear contradiction. But if one of the witnesses says: The murderer’s garments were black, and one of the witnesses says: The murderer’s garments were white, this is congruent testimony, as this is not a meaningful discrepancy.