and it was burned in the cauldron in which it was dyed, the dyer gives the owner the value of his wool. The Gemara infers: The value of his wool, yes, the dyer must pay that amount, but the value of the wool and its enhanced value, no, he need not pay. The Gemara suggests: Is this not referring to a case where the wool was burned after falling into the cauldron and the dye had taken hold, so that there is enhanced value, and one can learn from the mishna that a craftsman acquires ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel, and therefore the dyer need not pay the enhanced value?

Shmuel said: This is not a proof. With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the wool was burned at the moment of falling into the cauldron, before the dye had taken hold, so that there is no enhancement. The Gemara asks: But according to this opinion, what would the halakha be if it was burned after falling into the cauldron, when the dye had taken hold? Would the dyer give the owner the value of his wool and its enhancement? Shall we say that Shmuel does not accept the statement of Rav Asi, and holds that a craftsman does not acquire ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel?

The Gemara rejects this statement. Shmuel could have said to you: With what are we dealing here in the mishna? We are dealing with a case where the wool and herbs used in the dye both belong to the homeowner, and the dyer is taking only the payment of his hand, i.e., the wages for his labor, and nothing else. In this case, the craftsman does not acquire ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel, but in a case where the craftsman provides the materials, he does acquire such rights.

The Gemara asks: If so, i.e., if the homeowner’s herbs were also ruined by the dyer, the mishna should have said that the dyer gives the owner the value of his wool and herbs, not just the value of his wool. Rather, Shmuel is merely dismissing the Gemara’s proof with regard to the statement of Rav Asi that a craftsman acquires a vessel through its enhancement, by saying that the mishna could be understood otherwise. He does not, however, state his own opinion on this matter.

The Gemara offers another suggestion: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: With regard to one who gave his garment to a craftsman, and the craftsman concluded the work and notified the owner that the work was complete, even if the owner delays paying the craftsman from now until ten days henceforth, he does not violate, for this delay, the prohibition of: ''You shall not oppress your neighbor, nor rob him; the wages of a hired worker shall not abide with you all night until the morning'' (Leviticus 19:13). If the craftsman gave the garment to him at midday, then once the sun has set and the owner has not paid him, the owner does violate, for this delay, the prohibition against delaying the payment of wages.

The Gemara concludes: And if it enters your mind to say that a craftsman acquires ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel, why does the owner violate the prohibition against delaying the payment of wages? It is as if the craftsman acquired the garment, and the payment is considered to be a purchase of the garment by the owner, rather than a wage.

The Gemara responds: Rav Mari, son of Rav Kahana, said: The baraita is stating the halakha with regard to the laundering of a thick garment, where there is no enhancement of the garment. Therefore, the craftsman does not acquire it.

The Gemara asks: Ultimately, to what end did the owner of the garment give it to the craftsman? He gave it to him in order to soften it. Once he has softened it, that is its enhancement, and the craftsman has therefore acquired it. The Gemara responds: No; it is necessary to teach this halakha in a case where the owner hired the craftsman for treading, i.e., to forcefully tread on the garment in water until it softens, with the owner paying the craftsman a ma’a coin for each tread. The difference is that this is considered hired labor, where the craftsman is paid based on the amount of times he performed an action, and not contractual labor, where he is paid based on the outcome, in this case, a softened garment.

The Gemara comments: And with regard to what entered our minds initially, that the owner did not hire the worker for treading but rather he hired him like a craftsman based on the assumption that the garment would be returned laundered, this supports the opinion of Rav Sheshet. As they asked Rav Sheshet: If one hires a contractor, who is not paid an hourly wage but is paid upon the completion of his task, and the one who hired him does not pay him on the day that he completes the work, does he violate, for this delay, the prohibition against delaying the payment of wages, or does he not violate the prohibition? And Rav Sheshet said to them: He does violate the prohibition.

The Gemara asks: Shall we say based on this statement that Rav Sheshet disagrees with the statement of Rav Asi, who holds that a craftsman acquires ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel, and his payment is not considered to be a wage? Shmuel bar Aḥa said: Rav Sheshet is discussing a specific type of contractor, and he stated his ruling with regard to an agent tasked with the delivery of a letter, in which case, since the contractor’s only task is to deliver the letter, there is no enhancement through which he might acquire ownership rights. Consequently the prohibition against delaying the payment of wages applies.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the statement of Rav Asi, that a craftsman acquires ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel, is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im. As it is taught in a baraita: If a woman gave gold to a goldsmith, instructing him: Fashion bracelets, earrings, or rings for me, and I will be betrothed to you as payment for your work, then once he has fashioned them she is betrothed; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: She is not betrothed until money enters her possession.

The Gemara asks: What is this money mentioned by the Rabbis? If we say it means that very money, i.e., the rings she ordered, then by inference Rabbi Meir holds that even that very money is not required in order for the betrothal to take effect. But with what does he betroth her? He has given her nothing but the jewelry. Rather, it is obvious. To what money are the Rabbis referring? They must be referring to when he betroths her via other money, i.e., the payment she owes him for his service. According to the opinion of the Rabbis, in order for the betrothal to take effect he must give her additional money, while according to Rabbi Meir the betrothal takes effect when he gives her the jewelry.

The Gemara prefaces its explanation of the connection to the issue at hand by delineating two assumptions: And those who say that Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis are engaging in a dispute with regard to the issue of a craftsman acquiring ownership rights through the enhancement of a vessel assumed that everyone agrees that the obligation to pay a wage is incurred continuously from the beginning of the period he was hired to its end, i.e., the obligation to pay for a service begins when the hired party commences work, and the sum owed increases as he proceeds. The fact that he is not paid from the time he commences work establishes the wages as a debt. Consequently, the wages now have the status of a loan. And they also assumed that everyone agrees that with regard to one who betroths a woman with a loan that she is not betrothed. She therefore cannot be betrothed to him by not having to pay the wages for his work.

Based on these assumptions, the Gemara asks: What, is it not that they disagree with regard to whether a craftsman acquires ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel? As Rabbi Meir holds that a craftsman acquires ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel, and since he owns the enhanced value of the vessel, when he gives the jewelry to her he is giving her something valuable of his own, and she is betrothed. And the Rabbis hold that a craftsman does not acquire ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel, and since a craftsman, in this case, the goldsmith, does not own the jewelry, he cannot betroth a woman with it.

The Gemara rejects this explanation of the dispute: No, it is possible that everyone agrees that a craftsman does not acquire ownership rights through the enhancement of the vessel, but here they disagree with regard to the issue of whether the obligation to pay a wage is incurred continuously from the beginning of the period he was hired to its end.

Rabbi Meir holds that the obligation to pay a wage is incurred only at the end of the period for which he was hired, i.e., the owner is obligated to pay only when the work is complete, and therefore the goldsmith’s wages do not have the status of a loan, but of a sum of money that she becomes obligated to give him at that time. If he gives her the jewelry without asking for that money, it is as though he gave the money from his wages to her, and she may be betrothed with it. And the Rabbis hold that the obligation to pay a wage is incurred continuously from the beginning of the period he was hired to its end, and therefore his wages have the status of a loan, and she cannot be betrothed with them and must be given additional money.

And if you wish, say instead that everyone agrees that the obligation to pay a wage is incurred continuously from the beginning of the period he was hired to its end, and here they disagree with regard to one who betroths a woman with a loan. As Rabbi Meir holds that with regard to one who betroths a woman with a loan, she is betrothed. And the Rabbis hold that with regard to one who betroths a woman with a loan, she is not betrothed.