MISHNA: If a woman was standing on top of the roof and her husband was standing below, and he threw a bill of divorce to her, once the bill of divorce reaches the airspace of the roof, she is divorced. If he was above on the roof and she was below, and he threw it to her, once it leaves the area of the roof, even if the wording was erased or the document was burned before it fell to the ground, she is divorced.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: But isn’t the airspace of the roof unsecured? Since the bill of divorce can be blown away from the roof by the wind, it should be considered an unsecured courtyard, which does not acquire items. If so, why is she divorced once the bill of divorce reaches the airspace of the roof? Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: We are dealing with a roof that has a parapet. Therefore, it is like a secured courtyard, since the bill of divorce cannot be blown away.

Ulla bar Menashya said in the name of Avimi that there is another answer: Here we are dealing with a case in which the bill of divorce is within three handbreadths of the roof, as anything within three handbreadths of the roof is considered to be like the roof itself, based on the principle that views two solid surfaces as connected if the gap between them is less than three handbreadths wide.

§ It was taught in the mishna: If he was above and she was below, and he threw the bill of divorce to her, once it leaves the area of the roof, she is divorced. The Gemara asks: But isn’t the airspace of the courtyard not secured, since the bill of divorce can be blown out of the courtyard by the wind? Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: We are discussing a case where the lower partitions in the courtyard extend beyond the upper partitions on the roof, so that the bill of divorce will certainly fall in the courtyard.

And so Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Oshaya says: We are discussing a case where the lower partitions extend beyond the upper partitions. And so Ulla says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: We are discussing a case where the lower partitions extend beyond the upper partitions.

Rabbi Abba said to Ulla: In accordance with whose opinion is this halakha that once the bill of divorce enters the woman’s domain, it is considered as though it was given to her, even though it was destroyed before it landed on the ground? Is it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said that with regard to the prohibition of transferring an item from one domain to another on Shabbat, an object in airspace is considered at rest? This means that any item in the airspace of a domain is considered to be placed within that domain.

Ulla said to him: You can even say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, since the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi only with regard to Shabbat. They maintain that with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat, the item must actually come to rest in the domain to which it was transferred; while it is in the air, it is not considered as though it has landed on the ground. But here, in the case of divorce, it is because the bill of divorce is secured that she is divorced, and in this case it is secured while within the airspace of the partitions.

And so Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: We are discussing a case where the lower partitions in the courtyard extend beyond the upper partitions on the roof. Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Asi: In accordance with whose opinion is this halakha? Is it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who says that an object in airspace is considered at rest?

Rabbi Asi said to him: You can even say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, since the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi only with regard to Shabbat. But here, it is because the bill of divorce is secured that she is divorced, and in this case it is secured while within the airspace of the partitions.

§ It was taught in the mishna that once the bill of divorce leaves the domain of the roof, even if the writing was erased before it reached her hand, she is divorced with it. Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: They taught this halakha only when the writing was erased when it had already left the confines of the roof and was on its descent, entering her domain. But if the writing was erased while it was on its ascent, i.e., as it arched upward before falling down, then no, she is not divorced. What is the reason for this? Because initially, before it began its descent, the bill of divorce is not destined to land in her domain, since it could be blown elsewhere. Consequently, it cannot be considered as though it is already resting in her courtyard at that time.

It was taught in the mishna that once the bill of divorce leaves the domain of the roof, even if the document was burned before it reached her hand, she is divorced with it. Here, as well, Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: They taught this halakha only when the throwing of the bill of divorce preceded the fire. But if the fire preceded the throwing of the bill of divorce, then the woman is not divorced. What is the reason for this? Because initially, when the bill of divorce was thrown, it was heading toward being burned, and therefore it is considered that he never gave her a bill of divorce.

§ Rav Ḥisda says: Domains are divided with regard to bills of divorce. If there are several areas within the same domain, e.g., a house and a courtyard, or a courtyard and a roof, they are not all considered a single domain with regard to bills of divorce. Rather, each one is considered to be a separate domain.

Rami bar Ḥama said to Rava: From where does the Elder, i.e., Rav Ḥisda, derive this halakha? Rava said to him: It is derived from the mishna that taught: If the woman was standing on the top of the roof and her husband threw a bill of divorce to her from below, once the bill of divorce reaches the airspace of the roof, she is divorced.

Rava explains: With what are we dealing? If we say that we are dealing with a case of her roof and her courtyard, why do I require the bill of divorce to reach the airspace of the roof in order for her to be divorced? Even if the bill of divorce remained in the courtyard, she would be divorced, since it is her courtyard.

Rather, we must be dealing with a case of his roof and his courtyard. But when the bill of divorce reaches the airspace of the roof, what of it? Why is she then divorced, if the bill of divorce has not left his domain?

Rather, it is obvious that we are dealing with a case of her roof and his courtyard. Rava questions this conclusion: Say the latter clause of the mishna, which taught: If he was above on the roof and she was below, and he threw it to her, once it leaves the area of the roof, even if the wording was erased or the document was burned before it fell to the ground, she is divorced. And if we are dealing with a case of her roof and his courtyard, why is she divorced? Rather, it is necessary to say that we are dealing with a case of his roof and her courtyard.

Rava asks: Is it possible that the first clause in the mishna is dealing with a case of her roof and his courtyard, and the latter clause in the mishna is dealing with a case of his roof and her courtyard? How could the same mishna discuss two halakhot where each one is dealing with a different reality, without mentioning this distinction?

Rava explains Rav Ḥisda’s inference: Rather, is it not so that the mishna is dealing with a case where both the roof and the courtyard belong to him, but he lent her a place in his domain wherein she could acquire her bill of divorce, and she is standing in that place? In the first clause he lent her the roof, and in the second clause he lent her the courtyard, Consequently, only once it reaches that domain is she divorced. The reason why she does not acquire the bill of divorce until it reaches the specific domain that he lent her is that people lend only one place; people do not lend two places. Rav Ḥisda understood that one can infer from the mishna that the courtyard and roof remain as separate domains, and concludes that, with regard to bills of divorce, different areas in one domain are considered to be multiple domains.

Rami bar Ḥama said to Rava: Are the cases comparable? Perhaps this case is as it is and that case is as it is, i.e., the first clause in the mishna is dealing with a case of her roof and his courtyard, and the latter clause is dealing with a case of his roof and her courtyard. In some instances, one mishna deals with two different cases. Therefore, the mishna is not an adequate proof for Rav Ḥisda’s statement.

Rava says: There are three unique qualities with regard to bills of divorce, as compared to the halakhot of Shabbat. The first is that which Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: An object in airspace is considered at rest; and the Rabbis disagree with him. This matter about which they disagree applies only with regard to Shabbat. But here, in the case of divorce, it is because the bill of divorce is secured that she is divorced; and once the bill of divorce is within the airspace of the partitions, it is secured and the Rabbis agree that she is divorced.

And the second matter is that which Rav Ḥisda says concerning the halakhot of Shabbat: In the case of one who embedded a reed in the ground of a private domain, and on its top was a basket [teraskal], and he threw an object from the public domain and it rested on top of it, even if the reed was a hundred cubits high, he is liable because the private domain extends upward until the sky. Therefore, the object landed in a private domain. This matter applies only with regard to Shabbat, as with regard to Shabbat domains are defined based on their partitions and the way in which they are used, which differs from the way domains are defined in other halakhic areas. But here, in the case of divorce, it is because the bill of divorce is secured that she is divorced, and when it is on the reed it is not secured.