in a vessel: one master holds that appointing in a vessel is an act that counts, while the other master holds that it is not an act that counts. (1) Raba said: Now that we have said that there is a view that appointment through a vessel does not count, if one appointed six [logs] for a bullock (2) and removed four of them and offered them up without, he is liable, since they are fit for a ram. (3) If one appointed four [logs] for a ram and removed three of them and offered them up without, he is liable, since they are fit for a lamb. If they [the three logs] were slightly incomplete, he is not liable. (4) R. Ashi said: The Rabbis do not learn nisuk, (5) from haktarah, though it is without from without; they do learn haktarah from haktarah, though it is within from without. (6) IN THE CASE OF ALL OF THESE, IF THEY BECAME SLIGHTLY INCOMPLETE, etc. It was asked: Does incompleteness without count as incompleteness, or does it not count as incompleteness? (7) Do we say, since it went out, it was disqualified; what is the difference then whether there is less or more? (8) Or perhaps, only when it goes out and is wholly existent [does it involve liability], but not when it is not wholly existent? — Said Abaye, Come and hear: R. ELEAZAR RULES THAT ONE IS NOT LIABLE UNLESS HE PRESENTS THE WHOLE OF THEM, (9) Rabbah son of R. Hanan objected to Abaye: Does the master solve it from R. Eleazar? (10) — I explicitly heard it from a master, he replied: the Rabbis disagree with R, Eleazar only when the whole of it is available; but if it is incomplete, they agree with him. Surely that means, [even] if it became incomplete without? — No: [only] when it became incomplete within. Come and hear: IN THE CASE OF ALL OF THESE, IF THEY BECAME SLIGHTLY INCOMPLETE AND ONE OFFERED THEM WITHOUT, HE IS NOT LIABLE: does that not mean [even] where it became incomplete without? — No: [only] when it became incomplete within. ONE WHO OFFERS SACRIFICES [etc.]. Why so? surely it interposes? (11) — Said Samuel: It means where he turns them over. (12) R. Johanan said: You may even say that he does not turn them over, but the author of this is R. Simeon who maintained: Even if one offers them up on a rock or on a stone, he is liable. (13) Rab said: One kind is not an interposition for the same kind. (14) MISHNAH. IF THE FISTFUL OF A MEALOFFERING WAS NOT [YET] TAKEN, AND ONE OFFERED IT WITHOUT, HE IS NOT LIABLE. (15) IF ONE TOOK OFF THE FISTFUL, THEN REPLACED THE FISTFUL WITHIN IT, AND OFFERED IT WITHOUT, HE IS LIABLE. (16) GEMARA, But why so? let the remainder nullify the fistful? (17) — Said R. Zera: Haktarah is stated in connection with the fistful, and haktarah is stated in connection with the remainder: (18) as in the case of the haktarah stated in connection with the fistful, one fistful does not nullify another; (19) so in the case of haktarah stated in connection with the remainder, the remainder does not nullify the fistful. MISHNAH. AS FOR THE FISTFUL AND THE FRANKINCENSE, IF ONE OFFERED ONE OF THEM WITHOUT, HE IS LIABLE; R. ELIEZER RULES THAT HE IS NOT LIABLE UNLESS HE OFFERS THE SECOND [TOO]. (20) [IF ONE OFFERED] ONE WITHIN AND THE OTHER WITHOUT, (21) HE IS LIABLE, (22) AS FOR THE TWO DISHES OF FRANKINCENSE, (23) IF ONE OFFERED ONE OF THEM WITHOUT, HE IS LIABLE; R. ELIEZER RULES THAT HE IS NOT LIABLE UNLESS HE OFFERS THE SECOND [TOO]. [IF ONE OFFERED] ONE WITHIN AND THE OTHER WITHOUT, HE IS LIABLE. GEMARA. R. Isaac Nappaha (24) asked: Can the fistful permit a proportionate quantity of the remainder? (25) does it [the fistful] indeed permit, or does it merely weaken [the prohibition]? (26) — On whose view [is this question asked]? If on the view of R. Meir, who maintained, You can render a sacrifice Piggul through half of the mattir, (27) it indeed permits it; (28) and if on the view of the Rabbis who maintained that you cannot render a sacrifice Piggul through half of the Mattir, it may neither permit nor weaken it? (29) — Rather, [the question is asked] on the view of R. Eliezer. (30) But R. Eliezer agrees with the Rabbis? (31) — Rather, [the question is asked] on the view of the Rabbis here: (32) does it permit, or does it weaken? (33) The question stands over. MISHNAH. IF ONE SPRINKLES PART OF THE BLOOD WITHOUT, (34)

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(1). ↑ Both the Mishnah and the Baraitha treat of haktarah of the Hekal, where Scripture does not prescribe a fixed quantity. Therefore the Baraitha teaches that he is liable, and R. Eleazar agrees, as Rab stated. The controversy in the Mishnah arises where one appointed the whole peras that was to be burnt (by Rabbinical law) for its purpose by placing it in a vessel. R. Eleazar holds that this appointment is a substantial act, in the sense that if the priest does not burn it all in the Hekal it is not haktarah and the community is not quit of its obligation. Therefore one is not liable for burning it without unless he burns the whole of it. The Rabbis, however, hold that this appointing does not count at all, and so it is the same as any other incense.
(2). ↑ I.e., he put six logs of wine in a vessel, to be used for the drink-offering which accompanied the sacrifice of a bullock.
(3). ↑ This measure would suffice for a ram, and so he is culpable. If, however, appointment in a vessel counted as a substantial act, he would not be liable unless he offered up the whole six logs without.
(4). ↑ Because less than three logs are not fit for anything within.
(5). ↑ The act of offering libations.
(6). ↑ R. Ashi defends Abaye's explanation, and rebuts Raba's objection. — The text is emended.
(7). ↑ If the full standard was taken without (whereby it was immediately disqualified for use within), and then some of it was lost before he offered it up: does it count as incomplete or not?
(8). ↑ Since it is disqualified in any case, and yet one is liable for offering it without, he may also be liable when it becomes short without.
(9). ↑ Thus even if it is taken out whole, there is no liability unless it is offered whole.
(10). ↑ Surely not. For R. Eleazar holds that even if the whole is existent he is not liable unless he offers the whole, whereas the Rabbis hold that if the whole is existent one is liable when he offers as much as an olive. The question is asked on the view of the Rabbis.
(11). ↑ The flesh interposes between the fire and the emurim, and such would not constitute proper offering up within, for the emurim must lie directly on the fire.
(12). ↑ Sc. that the emurim laid on the fire.
(13). ↑ If even a proper altar is not necessary, it is certainly not necessary for the emurim to lie directly on the fire.
(14). ↑ Flesh is the same kind of matter as emurim, and therefore it does not count as an interposition.
(15). ↑ Because in that state it is not fit for offering within either.
(16). ↑ Because in that case, if it is offered within, it is valid; Men. 23a.
(17). ↑ Hence he should not be liable.
(18). ↑ Lev. II: 2: And he shall take thereout his handful... and ... shall make (it) smoke (we-hiktir). Ibid. 11: No meal-offering ... shall be made with leaven, for ye shall make no leaven, nor any honey, smoke (lo taktiru) as an offering made by fire unto the Lord. This is interpreted to mean that one must not burn (haktarah) any portion of the mealoffering whereof part is to be ‘an offering made by fire;’ hence it applies to the remainder, as part thereof (viz., the fistful) has been taken as ‘an offering made by fire’.
(19). ↑ Even if it exceeds it.
(20). ↑ Both must normally be offered before the remainder may be eaten (in the case of a votive meal-offering, to which this refers). Hence the two together are the Mattir (v. Glos.), and R. Eliezer holds that one is liable only when he offers without the whole Mattir.
(21). ↑ In this order.
(22). ↑ Because the second completes it, and had it been offered within, it would have permitted the consumption of the remainder.
(23). ↑ The burning of which permitted the eating of the Showbread.
(24). ↑ Or, the smith.
(25). ↑ V. n. 6, p. 540. If one burned the fistful alone, stating that this was to permit part of the remainder (which he determined beforehand), while the other part was to be permitted by the frankincense, is the first part thus permitted?
(26). ↑ Does the fistful completely permit part, in which case this part is now permitted; or does it merely weaken the prohibition of the whole, while the frankincense finally removes it? in that case it will still be forbidden.
(27). ↑ If the priest declares a Piggul intention at the burning of either the fistful or the frankincense, the offering is Piggul.
(28). ↑ For a sacrifice can be rendered Piggul only through a rite which completely permits it (or at least, a portion thereof), just as sprinkling completely permits an animal sacrifice. R. Meir then must certainly hold that the burning of the fistful permits part of the remainder.
(29). ↑ There is no proof that on their view the burning of the fistful either permits part or even weakens the prohibition of the whole.
(30). ↑ In our Mishnah: since he rules that one is not liable for burning that alone without, it may be that he holds that it permits part only.
(31). ↑ Sc. those who disagree with R. Meir, — I.e., the same difficulty that arises on the view of the Rabbis, sc. that they may hold that it neither permits nor weakens, arises on the view of R. Eliezer.
(32). ↑ In our Mishnah.
(33). ↑ Since they maintain that one is liable for burning the fistful alone without, they must regard the same within as a proper haktarah, even without the frankincense. Hence the question, in respect of what is it haktarah: is it in respect of permitting part, or in respect of weakening the whole?
(34). ↑ E.g., he made one application only; this holds good even in the case of the inner sin-offerings, where all the four applications are indispensable.