If one slaughters an animal with the express intention of sprinkling its blood or burning its fat to an idol, — R. Johanan said: It is forbidden [for any use] , (1) [for] an [effective] intention can be expressed at one service in respect to another service, and we learn ‘without’ from ‘within’. (2) Resh Lakish rules that it is permitted, (3) for an [effective] intention cannot be expressed at one service in respect of another service, and we do not learn ‘without’ from ‘within’. [Now these are both necessary.] For if we were informed [of their views] in the latter case, I might argue that Resh Lakish rules [thus only] in this instance, yet he agrees with R. Johanan [that] ‘within’ [is learnt] from ‘within’. (4) While if we were informed [of their views] in the former instance, I might argue that R. Johanan rules [thus only] there, yet he agrees with Resh Lakish in the present case. (5) Thus both are required. When R. Dimi came, (6) he said: R. Jeremiah raised an objection in support of R. Johanan, while R. Ela [did so] in support of Resh Lakish. R. Jeremiah in support of R. Johanan: If it is valid where one says, ‘Behold, I slaughter after its time [for slaughtering],’ (7) yet it is invalid if one slaughters it with the intention of sprinkling the blood after time; then seeing that it is invalid if he declares, ‘Behold, I slaughter for the sake of something else,’ is it not logical that it is invalid if one slaughters it with the intention of sprinkling the blood for the sake of something else? To this Raba b. Ahilai demurred: As for [intending to sprinkle its blood] after time, the reason [that this invalidates it even at the slaughtering] is that it entails kareth! (8) Rather said Raba b. Ahilai, This is his argument: If it is valid where one says, ‘Behold, I slaughter [this sacrifice] without its precincts,’ (9) yet it is invalid when one slaughters it with the intention of sprinkling its blood without its precincts; then seeing that it is invalid when he declares, ‘Behold, I slaughter for the sake of something else,’ is it not logical that it is invalid if one slaughters it with the intention of sprinkling the blood for the sake of something else? To this R. Ashi demurred: As for [its unfitness when one intends sprinkling the blood] without its precincts, the reason is because it operates [as a disqualification] in the case of all sacrifices. Will you say that the same applies in the case of an intention for the sake of a different sacrifice, which does not operate [thus] save in the case of a Passoveroffering and a sin-offering? Rather said R. Ashi, This is how he argues: If it is valid where one says, ‘Behold, I slaughter [this sacrifice] in the name of so-and-so,’ (10) yet it is invalid [if one declares his intention] to sprinkle its blood for the sake of so-and-so; then seeing that when he declares, ‘Behold, I slaughter [it] for the sake of something else,’ it is invalid, (11) is it not logical that it is invalid if he slaughters it with the intention of sprinkling the blood for the sake of something else? R. Ela [raised an objection] in support of Resh Lakish: Let it not be stated in the case of sprinkling (12) and it could be inferred a minori from slaughtering and receiving; (13) then for what purpose did the Divine Law state [it]? To teach that you cannot [effectively] express an intention in respect of one service at a [previous] service. (14) To this R. Papa demurred: Yet perhaps [its purpose is on the contrary to intimate] that you can express an intention in respect of one service at a [previous] service? — If so, let Scripture be silent about it, and infer it by R. Ashi's a minori argument. And the other? (15) — Refute [the argument] thus: as for those [slaughtering and receiving], the reason may be that they require the north (16) and are present at the inner sin-offerings. And the other? (17) — Now, at all events, we are discussing peace-offerings. (18) It was stated: If one slaughters it in its own name with the intention of sprinkling its blood for the sake of something else, — R. Nahman says: It is invalid; Rabbah says: It is valid. But Rabbah retracted on account of R. Ashi's a minori argument. R. ELIEZER SAID: THE GUILTOFFERING TOO. It was taught: R. Eliezer said: A sin-offering comes on account of sin, and a guilt- offering comes on account of sin: just as a sin-offering [slaughtered] under a different designation is invalid, so is a guiltoffering invalid [if slaughtered] under a different designation. Said R. Joshua to him: That is not so. If you say [thus] of the sinoffering, [the reason is] because its blood is [sprinkled] above [the scarlet line]. (19) Said R. Eliezer to him: Let the Passover-offering prove it: though its blood is [sprinkled] below, yet if one slaughters it for the sake of something else it is invalid. As for the Passover-offering, replied R. Joshua, the reason is that it has a fixed time. Said R. Eliezer to him: Then let the sin-offering prove it. R. Joshua replied:

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(1). ↑ Even it he did not eventually sprinkle it thus,
(2). ↑ Idolatrous sprinkling of the blood, etc. is naturally done without the Temple, while the illegitimate action of Piggul is done within the Temple.
(3). ↑ It he did not eventually sprinkle it idolatrously.
(4). ↑ Sc. if one slaughters a sacrifice with the intention of sprinkling its blood in the name of a different sacrifice, his illegitimate intention is in respect of something that is done within, and therefore we learn by analogy from Piggul that his intention is effective.
(5). ↑ By reversing the argument.
(6). ↑ From Palestine to Babylon. R. Dimi and Rabin were two Palestinian Amoraim who travelled between the Palestinian and the Babylonian academics to transmit the teachings of one to the other.
(7). ↑ Since whenever he slaughters it, that is the time,
(8). ↑ This illegitimate intention renders the flesh Piggul immediately, so that if one eats it even within the permitted time he is liable to kareth. Since it is so strict, it is natural that an illegitimate intention in respect of one service expressed at an earlier service is effective.
(9). ↑ For his declaration cannot negative the fact that he is slaughtering it within its precincts.
(10). ↑ For change of name is a disqualification at the sprinkling, but not at the slaughtering.
(11). ↑ Viz., in the case of a Passover-offering and a sinoffering.
(12). ↑ That an intention for a different sacrifice disqualifies it.
(13). ↑ It slaughtering for the sake of a different sacrifice disqualifies, though it is valid when done by a zar (lay-Israelite), how much the more sprinkling, which may not be performed by a zar. And if you answer that slaughtering may be more stringent because a Passover-offering slaughtered for others than those enrolled for it is invalid; then let receiving prove it, where this disqualification does not operate.
(14). ↑ I.e., the illegitimate intention in respect of sprinkling must be expressed at the sprinkling.
(15). ↑ R. Johanan: How does he rebut this argument?
(16). ↑ They are performed at the north side of the altar.
(17). ↑ Resh Lakish: how does he rebut this argument?
(18). ↑ Which are not slaughtered at the north nor on the inner altar. Hence the argument does not apply.
(19). ↑ The blood of some sacrifices was sprinkled on the upper half of the altar, and the blood of other sacrifices was sprinkled on the lower half; a scarlet line on the altar demarcated them. — The fact that the blood of the sin-offering was sprinkled above that line may be the reason for greater stringency.