If one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from non-sacred money and its loaves from second-tithe money, he must bring the thanks offering and its loaves from non-sacred money. If one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from second-tithe money and its loaves from non-sacred money, he may bring it in that manner. Likewise, if one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering and its loaves from second-tithe money, he may bring it in that manner. And he may not bring the loaves from second-tithe wheat; rather, he purchases the flour with second-tithe money.

GEMARA: With regard to the various ways in which one can take a vow to bring a thanks offering and its loaves, Rav Huna says: One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring loaves of a thanks offering, must bring a thanks offering and its loaves, even though he did not expressly take upon himself the obligation to bring the thanks offering itself. What is the reason? This man knows that loaves are not brought without a thanks offering, and by stating the vow in this manner, he was effectively saying: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering and its loaves. And the reason he stated his vow in this manner, namely, by saying: It is incumbent upon me to bring loaves of a thanks offering, was that he was citing the end of the matter, as the sacrifice of a thanks offering is completed with the bringing of the loaves.

The Gemara raises a difficulty with the statement of Rav Huna from that which we learned in the mishna: If one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from second-tithe money and its loaves from non-sacred money, he may bring it as he vowed. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rav Huna that one who takes a vow to bring the loaves of a thanks offering intends to bring the thanks offering as well, why does the mishna state that he may bring the thanks offering from second-tithe money? Since he said: Its loaves from non-sacred money, he should bring a thanks offering and its loaves from non-sacred money.

The Gemara responds: It is different there, in the case of the mishna, as since he said initially: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from second-tithe money, and then said: And its loaves from non-sacred money, he is considered as one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring loaves to exempt the thanks offering of so-and-so. His vow to bring the loaves is not considered a new vow, but rather as a vow to bring loaves for the specific offering he vowed to bring.

The Gemara asks: If that is so, then with regard to the first clause of the mishna, which teaches that if one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from non-sacred money and its loaves from second-tithe money, then he must bring the thanks offering and its loaves from non-sacred money, here too let it be said that he is considered as one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering to exempt the loaves of so-and-so, and he therefore should bring a thanks offering from second tithe. His initial vow to bring a thanks offering from non-sacred money should not include the bringing of the loaves.

The Gemara rejects this: How can these cases be compared? Granted, in a case where one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from second-tithe money and its loaves from non-sacred money, it can be said that he intends that the loaves should be brought to complete the vow of one who is obligated to bring a thanks offering, because loaves come to exempt the thanks offering. But in a case where one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from non-sacred money and its loaves from second-tithe money, it cannot be said that the thanks offering is meant to complete the vow of one who is obligated to bring the loaves of a thanks offering, as does a thanks offering come to exempt the loaves?

The Gemara continues to discuss the statement of Rav Huna that one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring loaves of a thanks offering, must bring a thanks offering and its loaves. Come and hear a proof from a baraita that contradicts the opinion of Rav Huna: In the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering without loaves, or an animal offering without libations, the court coerces him, and he brings a thanks offering with its loaves, or an offering with its libations.

The Gemara infers: The reason that he is coerced to bring a thanks offering with its loaves is that he said that it is incumbent upon himself to bring a thanks offering. But if he did not say that it is incumbent upon himself to bring a thanks offering, but instead said that it is incumbent upon himself to bring the loaves of a thanks offering, he would not be coerced to bring a thanks offering with the loaves, in contradiction to the opinion of Rav Huna.

The Gemara rejects this: Actually, the same is true even if he did not say that it is incumbent upon himself to bring a thanks offering, but said only: It is incumbent upon me to bring the loaves. And this is the reason that the tanna of the baraita mentions specifically the case of one who renders himself obligated to bring a thanks offering without loaves: Since the tanna wants to teach the case of one who renders himself obligated to bring an animal offering without libations, concerning which he could not teach a case where one renders himself obligated to bring libations without an offering, because, unlike the loaves of a thanks offering, libations are in fact brought on their own and one can take a vow to bring them on their own, he therefore also taught the case of one who renders himself obligated to bring a thanks offering.

The Gemara addresses the actual statement of the baraita and asks: Why is he coerced to bring a thanks offering and its loaves? Isn’t this an instance of a vow with its inherent opening? That is, the vow should be dissolved entirely on the grounds that the one who took the vow may claim that he thought it was possible to bring a thanks offering without loaves, and now that he has been made aware that he cannot, he regrets taking the vow.

Ḥizkiyya said: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, who say: In the case of one who stated a declaration comprising two contradictory statements, attend to only the first statement. As we learned in a mishna (Nazir 9a): If one says: I am hereby a nazirite from dried figs and from pressed figs, which is a contradictory statement, as figs are not prohibited to a nazirite, Beit Shammai say: He is a full-fledged nazirite, as one attends only to the first statement, i.e., I am hereby a nazirite, and the second part is discounted. And Beit Hillel say: The second part of his statement is not discounted, and therefore he is not a nazirite, as he did not accept naziriteship upon himself.

Rabbi Yoḥanan says: You may even say that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, and the ruling of the baraita is with regard to one who says: Had I known that one does not vow in this manner, i.e., to bring a thanks offering without loaves or an animal offering without libations, I would not have vowed in this manner but in that manner, i.e., I would have vowed to bring a thanks offering with its loaves. There is therefore no opening for a dissolution. And what does the baraita mean when it states that the court coerces him? Why would he require coercion if he says that he would have willingly taken the proper vow? The baraita is referring to a case where, despite the fact that he would have taken the proper vow initially, he now wants to retract his vow altogether.

The Gemara cites a baraita in support of the response of Ḥizkiyya: Come and hear: In a case involving one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering without loaves, or: It is incumbent upon me to bring an animal offering without libations, and the Sages said to him: Bring a thanks offering with its loaves, or: Bring an animal offering with its libations, and he says: Had I known that such is the requirement I would not have vowed at all; the halakha is that the court coerces him, and says to him: ''Observe and hear'' (Deuteronomy 12:28).

The Gemara continues: Granted, this works out well according to Ḥizkiyya, who says that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai that one attends only to the first statement, since this baraita can also be explained in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai. But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says that the baraita discusses a case where the person who took the vow says: Had I known that one does not vow in this manner I would have vowed to bring a thanks offering with its loaves, this baraita presents a difficulty, as although the individual claims that he would not have taken any vow, he must still bring a thanks offering and its loaves. The Gemara responds: Rabbi Yoḥanan could have said to you: This latter baraita is certainly in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, but the previous baraita may still be explained in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel.

The Gemara turns to analyze the baraita itself: What is the relevance of the phrase in the verse that says: ''Observe and hear,'' to one who vows to bring a thanks offering without its loaves? Abaye says: ''Observe'' means: Bring a thanks offering; ''and hear'' means: Bring its loaves. Rava says: ''Observe'' means: Bring a thanks offering and its loaves; ''and hear'' means that you should not act in this manner regularly.

§ The mishna teaches that if one states: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering and its loaves from second-tithe money, he shall bring it in that manner. The Gemara asks: Why does the mishna teach: He shall bring, which suggests that he must bring the thanks offering and loaves from second-tithe money? Is it not sufficient to fulfill his vow even if he does not bring it from second-tithe money but from non-sacred money? In fact, it is preferable that he bring the offering from non-sacred money. Rav Naḥman and Rav Ḥisda say: The mishna does not mean that he must bring it specifically from second-tithe money; rather, if he wants, he brings it from second-tithe money, and if he does not want, he does not need to bring it from second-tithe money.

§ The mishna teaches: And he may not bring the loaves from second-tithe wheat; rather, he purchases the flour with second-tithe money. With regard to this, Rav Naḥman and Rav Ḥisda both say: The mishna taught only that the loaves may not be brought from second-tithe wheat itself, but he may bring the loaves from wheat purchased with second-tithe money.

The Gemara relates: Rabbi Yirmeya was sitting before Rabbi Zeira, and he was sitting and saying: The mishna taught only that the loaves may not be brought from second-tithe wheat itself, but he may bring the loaves from wheat purchased from second-tithe money. Rabbi Zeira said to him: My teacher, do you say so? I say that he may not bring the loaves even from wheat purchased from second-tithe money. And I will say my reasoning and I will say your reasoning. I will say your reasoning first: From where do you derive that the loaves of a thanks offering may be brought from wheat purchased with second-tithe money? You derive it from the halakha of a peace offering. A thanks offering is a type of peace offering, as the verse states: ''And the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings for thanks'' (Leviticus 7:15), and a peace offering may be brought from second-tithe money.